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Security - A function of threat likelihood, asset resilience and damage 
consequences. 
Factor - Plays an integral role in quantifying security of an asset. 
Measure - Quantifies how much the factor contributes to asset security. 
Attribute - Level of the measure rated on a scale to define the overall 
amount that the measure contributes to the factor. 
SR - Security Rating 
Asset - Specific transportation infrastructure (roadways, bridges, 
tunnels, pipeline, airports, guardrails, etc.). 
Threat - Any unexpected natural, unintentional man-made or intentional 
man-made event that causes damage or disruption. 
Threat Likelihood - The probability of a threat occurring that effects the asset. 
Resilience - The ability of the asset to withstand and recover from the threat. 
Consequence - The effects of the failure of an asset and its associated costs and 
damages. 
NBI - National Bridge Inventory 
ESR - Existing Security Rating 
ISR - Increase in Security Rating 
FSR - Final Security Rating 
GIS - Geographic Information System 
ADT - Average Daily Travel 
NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
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Transportation project evaluation and prioritization use traditional performance 
measures including travel time, safety, user costs, economic efficiency, and 
environmental quality. The project impacts in terms of enhancing the infrastructure 
resilience or mitigating the consequences of infrastructure damage in the event of disaster 
occurrence are rarely considered in project evaluation. This dissertation presents a 
methodology to address this issue so that in evaluating and prioritizing investments, 
infrastructure with low security can receive the attention they deserve. Secondly, the 
methodology can be used for evaluating and prioritizing candidate investments dedicated 
specifically to security enhancement. In defining security as a function of threat 
likelihood, asset resilience and damage consequences, this dissertation uses security-
related considerations in investment prioritization thus adding further robustness in 
traditional evaluations. As this leads to an increase in the number of performance criteria 
in the evaluation, the dissertation adopts a multiple-criteria analysis approach. The 
methodology quantifies the overall security level for an infrastructure in terms of the 
threats it faces, its resilience to damage, and the consequences in the event of the 
infrastructure damage. The dissertation demonstrates that it is feasible to develop a 
security-related measure that can be used as a performance criterion in the evaluation of 
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general transportation projects or projects dedicated specifically towards security 
improvement. Through a case study, the dissertation applies the methodology by 
measuring the risk (and hence, security) of each for bridge infrastructure in Indiana. The 
method was also fuzzified and a Monte Carlo simulation was run to account for unknown 
data and uncertainty. On the basis of the multiple types of impacts including risk impacts 
such as the increase in security due to each candidate investment, this dissertation shows 













CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Importance of Transportation Infrastructure 
National transportation systems are vast interconnected networks of diverse 
modes and due to its diversity and size; these infrastructure systems play a major role in 
the economy and national security of nations (Steffey, 2008). The transportation industry 
comprises many modes of travel (air, rail, vehicle, waterway, pipeline) and involves over 
nine million jobs that enable a monumental amount of passengers and goods to move 
throughout the world annually (Polzin 2012; DHS, 2011; BLS, 2011). Activities in the 
transportation sector make up 12% of the gross domestic economy and most businesses 
rely on a functioning transportation system to move their products. In the United States, 
the marine transportation system, including ports, waterways, and vessels, handles more 
than $900 billion in international commerce every year (Lundquist, 2011). Freight 
revenue on railroads in 2010 was $56.3 billion (AAR, 2012). Air transportation revenue 
in the U.S. totaled $134.7 billion in 2011, 6.8% higher than the previous record set in 
2008 (Herbst, 2012).  
There are about 600,000 bridges in the overall U.S. network with approximately 
1,000 identified as “critical” due to possible casualties, economic disruption, or other 
consequences if they are rendered dysfunctional for any reason (AASHTO, 2003). The 
losses due to a critical bridge or tunnel could exceed $10 billion. The U.S. transportation 
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system includes 337 highway tunnels and 211 transit tunnels, many of which are located 
under bodies of water and may have limited alternative routes due to geographic 
constraints (AASHTO, 2003). There are 8,606,003 lane-miles of pavement in the United 
States (FHWAa, 2014). Railway has a total of 139,118 miles of infrastructure within the 
U.S. (FHWA, 2011). Shipping and ports are vital elements in the economic and military 
activities of most countries in the world due to their extensive size, open accessibility, 
and metropolitan location that ensure a free flow of trade, but present great challenges to 
effective monitoring and control of traffic (Steffey, 2008). 
The abundance of infrastructure networks has led to their criticality in performing 
the functions of everyday life as well as their interconnectedness with other infrastructure 
networks, industries, and workforces that rely upon them (Barker et al., 2013). Because 
of its diversity and size, a national transportation system is vital to a country’s economy 
and national security. Without the transportation industry, thousands of jobs directly or 
indirectly connected to this industry, would be lost, and products and goods would not be 
mobile within and outside of the country. Malevolent attacks, natural disasters, man-
made accidents, or common failures can have significant widespread impacts when they 
lead to the failure of network components (Barker et al., 2013). If one part of the system 
is impaired, delays and stagnant goods would hinder companies’ profits, cause user 
delays, and disrupt everyday life. Intermodal transportation would also be affected if one 
mode is unable to complete its part of transporting a good or passengers. Transportation 
plays a major role in a country’s economy and therefore should be made as resilient as 
possible to failures or damage to enable necessary mobility.   
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1.2. Threats to Transportation Infrastructure 
Disasters can result in millions and even billions of dollars worth of damage not 
only to the physical infrastructure but also in terms of the economic and social 
consequences resulting from impaired functionality of the infrastructure. For example, 
Hurricane Sandy, which hit the U.S. eastern coast in 2012, caused about $50 billion in 
damages, and the 2011 tsunami in Japan caused about $308 billion in damage (Porter, 
2013; Ridgwell, 2011). Also, events such as the Paramount Boulevard Bridge accident in 
California cost $40 million in damages and repair and the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge 
Pier failure in Wisconsin cost $20 million in investigation and repair costs (Tata, 2012; 
Phelps, 2013). The occurrence and magnitude of natural or man-made disasters cannot be 
predicted with absolute certainty; however, if civil infrastructure systems can be made to 
better withstand the potential damage resulting from these disasters, the consequences 
and costs of repair may be reduced.   
Similar to all civil infrastructure systems, transportation assets encounter end-of-
life situations when they face intended or unintended agents that cause their destruction 
(Labi, 2014). Unintended termination can be caused by the failure of the asset itself due 
to factors including design flaws, fatigue, advanced deterioration, and other internal 
causes; or due to external agents such as overloading, accidents, or natural events. 
Intended end-of-life events include deliberate retirement due to structural or functional 
obsolescence. Also, transportation infrastructure make attractive targets of intentional 
harmful attacks because of their visibility, accessibility, and capacity to carry large 
numbers of commuters in a relatively confined space (Steffey, 2008). Maritime and 
4 
 
surface transportation systems are vulnerable to attacks by terrorists who seek to attract 
publicity, and any successful attack can inflict high numbers of civilian casualties and 
cause political and economic disruption (Steffey, 2008). Transportation assets are widely 
distributed and most routes have multiple entry points and open accessibility which 
precludes 100% protection of these assets (Steffey, 2008). This in turn necessitates that a 
certain degree of risk of damage or destruction is always attached to these transportation 
assets.    
1.3. Assessing Risks and Protecting Transportation Infrastructure 
Security-related system engineering is defined as the protection of physical 
infrastructure components and logical structures and processes from threats and 
vulnerabilities (Garcia, 2001). As Polzin (2012) stated, transportation requires security 
for numerous reasons including: it is a critical element of the economy; it is a gathering 
place for groups of people; it has symbolic and emotional importance; it provides a 
delivery means for people and products; it includes institutions with licensing and 
enforcement responsibilities. As a National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
panel stated, “the source of the threat was only one issue -- the loss of an asset has the 
same consequence whatever the cause of the loss” (Cambridge and Parker, 2011). 
Security concerns play a large role in how transportation facilities and services are 
provided (Polzin, 2012). Malicious individuals regularly attempt to disrupt the operations 
of modern transport; worse still, terrorists seek to reap political dividends by attacking 
transportation infrastructure and seeking its destruction (Flynn, 2000). The consequences, 
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which are numerous, include: casualty impact (the potential for loss or serious injury to 
human life); business continuity (the extent to which loss or serious damage to the asset 
would impair the ability of the agency to continue to operate); economic impact (the 
extent to which loss or serious damage to the asset would affect the viability of business 
going forward); replacement cost (the capital investment required to replace the asset); 
and replacement downtime (the length of time before the asset can be returned to service) 
(Frazier, 2009). 
Existing normal methodologies for assessing and managing risks to transportation 
infrastructure provide a valuable conceptual structure and practical tools for allocating 
resources in cost-effective ways to improve public safety (Steffey, 2008). The U.S.’s 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan was updated in 2009 to build a safer, more secure 
and resilient country by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of 
deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate or exploit elements of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and key resources (Fisher and Norman, 2010). The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) pledged to follow a systems-based risk-management 
approach that incorporates three main elements: threat, vulnerability (including 
criticality), and consequence (Steffey, 2008). Publicly Available Specification 55 Part 2 
(PAS 55-2) in the UK states that risk management is fundamental for proactive asset 
management and that its purpose is to understand the cause, effect and likelihood of 
adverse events occurring in order to manage these risks to an acceptable level (Hooper et 
al., 2009). The International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM) is a guidance 
document focused on the experiences of Australia, New Zealand, UK, South Africa and 
the U.S. (INGENIUM, 2006). IIMM recommends that core asset management should 
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identify critical assets and events and should apply risk management techniques to these 
assets (Hooper et al., 2009). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Enhanced 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) program has a goal of providing owners and 
operators with information to help them make better-informed risk management 
decisions; DHS collects data during ECIP visits to support risk reduction investment 
parameters and processes, identify gaps that require additional programming, activities 
and functions to mitigate, and understand and inform the national risk picture through 
detailed analysis (Fisher and Norman, 2010).  
There are a few general steps that are required to help reduce unintentional natural 
or man-made termination of transportation infrastructure. The first is to measure the 
threat likelihood posed by external forces to the asset itself. If the threats are at all 
predictable based on historical data such as earthquake occurrence or tendency to flood, 
these measurable threat probabilities can help determine if an asset is located in a high 
threat area. Second, the threat likelihood can be monitored over time to see if patterns 
arise so the asset can be improved to increase its physical resistance or resilience before 
the threat strikes. Third, the benefits of any implemented improvements must be assessed 
in terms of their effectiveness in reducing the possible consequences in the event of a 
threat occurrence. The fourth step involves communicating the gathered information to 
serve as evidence for securing the needed funding for security investments. What is 
missing from these steps is a way to quantify security to be able to tell which assets are at 
the greatest overall risk. As such, a better case could be made to help improve the 
security of the transportation infrastructure.  
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Uncertainty must be considered when working with security factors. Hazards are 
highly non-deterministic. For example, the magnitude of earthquakes or the number of 
accidents cannot be predicted at 100% accuracy. The failure to consider uncertainty could 
lead to assets being unprepared for the potential range of hazards that could impair the 
asset and ultimately, widen consequences to the community and the economy. It is 
possible to account for uncertainty using historical data trends and predictive models to 
provide a range of likelihood scenarios for hazards that could potentially harm the asset.   
In any given jurisdiction, there typically exists a wide range of threat types to 
transportation infrastructure; however, if such threats to each asset can be identified, and 
if the expected reduction in the asset damage due to security-enhancing investments can 
be predicted, the reduction in the disaster consequences can be estimated. When 
infrastructure is made resilient through security investments, the consequences of end-of-
life events can be reduced and the infrastructure itself can play a role in mitigating or 
recovering from the overall damage resulting from the event. 
1.4. Problem Statement 
At present, the funding allocation processes for transportation infrastructure at 
most agencies utilize performance measures that include the expected change in asset 
condition or remaining life, economic efficiency, energy use, land use, air quality, 
connectivity, and so on (Sinha and Labi, 2007). However, the impacts of competing 
investments on asset security are rarely considered in a direct manner. Thus, for assets 
that are located in an area of high threat likelihood, their respective candidate investments 
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could help reduce the potential for infrastructure damage (and the consequent adverse 
impacts on the community). Current evaluation processes do not account for such 
beneficial impacts of the investments. As such, it is reasonable to argue that a 
performance measure that quantifies the security benefits (reduction of infrastructure 
damage risk due to external threats) should be considered in transportation investment 
evaluation and also in the prioritization of funds dedicated specifically to security.    
Current funding allocation processes for transportation infrastructure rely on key 
parameters. For example, asset performance measures (age, condition, etc.), area 
performance measures (e.g. air quality), maintenance cycles, and budgets are studied to 
determine which specific assets receive funds for asset reconstruction or rehabilitation. 
For assets located in high threat areas (e.g., an area with high potential for earthquakes or 
landslides), current performance measures would most likely not reflect these situations 
and cannot suffice in a comprehensive evaluation of such project evaluations. As such, a 
performance measure quantifying security must be considered in the multi-criteria 
decision making process as another important key measure for investment prioritization. 
This would further align with the goals set by the Homeland Security Transportation 
Systems Sector: prevent and deter acts of terrorism against the transportation system; 
enhance the all-hazards preparedness and resilience of the global transportation system; 
improve the effective use of resources for transportation security; improve sector 
situational awareness, understanding, and collaboration (DHS, 2011).  
There are five key steps to risk management that should be considered to develop 
evidence for security investments: measure the threat likelihood posed by external or 
intentional threats to the asset; monitor the threat likelihood over time; assess the 
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effectiveness of actions intended to reduce consequences; communicate this information 
to the general public and legislators; and provide evidence for appropriate resources. On 
the basis of these steps, a methodology should be developed and thereby make it feasible 
to consider security as one of the performance measures for general investment 
evaluation or to establish a priority list of assets for security investment. 
The first step is to measure the threat likelihood posed by forces external to the 
asset. If historical data such as earthquake occurrence or flooding tendency are available, 
then these threat probabilities can be calculated to identify the areas of high threat 
likelihood. The second step states that the threat likelihood can be monitored over time to 
identify the optimal time of intervention. The third step states that the effectiveness of 
asset improvements can be assessed in terms of the extent to which they can reduce the 
damage or other adverse consequences if the threat does occur. The fourth step involves 
communicating the gathered information to serve as support material for requesting 
funding purposely for investments geared toward securing the infrastructure from 
damage. With these steps and a required security metric, a case for improving 
transportation infrastructure in terms of security, can be made or strengthened.     
1.5. Objectives/Scope 
There are four main objectives of this dissertation. The first is to develop a 
methodology to quantify security for each asset for all relevant threats to that specific 
asset which incorporates the five steps of risk management. The second objective is to 
incorporate dynamic concepts into the methodology to capture uncertainty. The third 
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objective is to apply the methodology to carry out prioritization of security investments. 
The fourth objective is to apply the methodology to investment evaluation on the basis of 
multiple criteria. The overall framework can be used for varying kinds of infrastructure 
(marine, power, other transportation modes, real estate), however, the case study is 
described specifically in the context of highway infrastructure.    
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to support strategic resource allocation 
decisions at the asset level by providing meaningful measures of security risk that lend 
themselves to quantitative benefit-cost analysis (McGill et al., 2007). Since primary 
responsibility for management of incidents involving transportation normally rests with 
State and local authorities and the private sector, which own and operate the majority of 
the nation’s transportation resources (Emergency Support Function #1 Annex Policies 
Section-Transportation Annex), this methodology would be useful in deciding which 
assets should receive funds to improve their security.    
1.6. Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the role of 
transportation in the economy and provides the rationale for protecting transportation 
infrastructure. The chapter also presents the dissertation’s problem statement, objectives, 
and scope. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the current risk assessment 
methodologies and discusses the general security variables and how the methods define 
the terminology. Chapter 3 describes the proposed security metric that was developed in 
this dissertation to address the limitations of traditional methods. Chapters 4 and 5 use the 
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developed method to assess security at the asset level and network level. Chapter 6 
introduces dynamic concepts into the method developed in the dissertation and provides 
case studies. Chapter 7 discusses how to incorporate the security metric into investment 
decision making and project evaluation, and Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the 








CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Risk assessment involves the concepts of threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
information. Risk management, on the other hand, involves deciding which protective 
measures to take based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy (Moteff, 2005). The 
security industry has been slow to use measurable factors in reducing risk because of 
difficulties in establishing security-related metrics (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). Due to 
the difficult nature of quantifying key components of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence, transportation security risk analysis generally employ qualitative methods 
in making judgments about the magnitudes of various risk situations (Steffey, 2008). 
Many in the security industry believe that qualitative analysis is sufficient to address the 
protection of lower value assets. Typically, a qualitative assessment assigns relative 
values to specific assets based on factors such as the criticality of loss or replacement 
costs. The threats against assets are also given a relative value based on their probability 
of occurrence. The result is a risk equation that computes risk as both a function of 
impact and likelihood of incidence. The goal of a security design strategy should be the 
logical and incremental “buy down” of security risk, in order to provide acceptable levels 
of protection for transportation agency assets and operations on a continuing basis (SAIC 




The terminology used when describing security related factors include the terms 
defined in Table 2.1. which are found in the literature.  
 
Table 2.1. Security Terminology  
 
 
Term  Definition  Consistent with:  
Asset-related 
Terms  
Target  Transportation asset that has 
value to the owner or users  
SAIC & PB Consult, 
2009 
Resilience  The ability of the asset to 




An unexpected natural, 
unintentional  man-made or 
intentional  man-made event 
that causes damage or 
disruption  




The probability of a threat 
effecting the asset  Ayyub et al., 2007  
Consequence-
related Terms  Consequence  
The loss of an asset and its 
associated costs and damages  




Threat likelihood is defined as the probability that an external or internal threat 
will occur (Labi, 2014). This definition involves the specific threat type and 
characteristics of the infrastructure such as location and orientation. Threats to civil 
infrastructure are in the form of unintended damage and intended damage, with the added 
categories of internal damage and external damage. For example, external unintended 
threats could be a sudden event like an earthquake, or a gradual event such as those seen 
during a freeze-thaw. Internal unintentional threats may be design flaws or aging of the 
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infrastructure itself. Intentional man-made threats take on the form of terrorist attacks and 
vandalism, while other man-made threats consist of overloading and collisions. Figure 
2.1 below from Labi (2014) describes the different variations threats to civil 
infrastructure can take. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Possible Threats to Civil Infrastructure 
 
The USDOT and FHWA organized threats to a transportation asset management 
program into three groups: asset specific, program specific, and management specific 
(FHWA, 2012). Examples of asset specific threats, both internal and external, include: 
• Premature asset failures caused by faulty construction or materials; 
• Chance failures caused by unpredicted events such as barges striking bridges or 
truck fires weakening beams; 
• Abrupt failures caused by climatic or seismic events such as flooding, landslides 
or seismic activity, or; 
• “Creeping failure” caused by gradual degradation spurred by traffic, 





Program specific threats include: 
 
• Wear-out failures caused by inadequate maintenance programs; 
• Decision failures caused by inaccurate data or models; 
• Resource failures caused by reductions in appropriations or increases in prices;  
• Operational failures caused by process breakdowns, or;  
• Demand failures caused by unanticipated vehicle loadings. 
Management specific threats include those decisions made by agencies or owners of 
transportation infrastructure including: 
• The failure to manage physical assets for the long term as official policy;  
• Legislative mandates such as “worst first” that could detract from sound asset 
management;  
• Substantial reductions in asset management funding, or;  
• Internal bureaucratic resistance to asset management that can be addressed only 
by senior leadership. 
 
Threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential treats on the basis of factors 
such as capabilities, intentions, and past occurrences (Steffey, 2008). Quantifying and 
assessing risk involves the calculation and comparison of probabilities, but most 
expressions involve compound measures that consider both the probability of harm and 
its severity (Melnick and Everitt, 2008). ASCE SEI determined that the estimation 
probability of failure involves the evaluation of: (i) the probability of the occurrence of a 
particular type of hazard or combination; (ii) the maximum intensity of the hazards that 
the system is exposed to within its service life; (iii) the probability that the system will 
exhibit a particular level of damage/local failure/collapse should the hazard take place. 
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Threat likelihood data can be derived from past figures detailing the frequency of 
occurrence or simulation of the event using theoretical resources. 
2.3. System Resilience 
Resilience can be defined as the ability to manage risks and bounce back quickly 
from damage (Flynn and Burke, 2011). A study by Barker et al. (2013) focuses on two 
dimensions of resilience over time, vulnerability and recoverability, for the development 
of a resilience-based component importance measure (CIM) for system analysis. 
Resilience can also be defined as a function of infrastructure age, condition, material 
type, design type, and other physical characteristics of which help the infrastructure 
recover after a disruption by a threat (Labi, 2014). The New Mexico Environmental 
Finance Center stated that an asset “may be highly likely to fail if it is old, has a long 
history of failure, has a known failure record in other locations, and has a poor condition 
rating; and an asset may be much less likely to fail if it is newer, is highly reliable, has 
little to no history of failure and has a good to excellent condition rating” (EFC, 
2006).The Infrastructure Security Partnership (2011) noted that a resilient infrastructure 
sector would “prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond or mitigate any anticipated or 
unexpected significant threat or event” and “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical 
assets, operations, and services with minimum damage and disruption” (Barker et al., 
2013). The Resilient Systems Working Group (RSWG) of the International Council on 
Systems Engineering (INCOSE) was established to enhance systems resilience so that the 
recovery from disasters could be enhanced. A working definition for resilience developed 
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by the RSWG is as follows: “the capability of a system with specific characteristics 
before, during, and after a disruption to absorb the disruption, recover to an acceptable 
level of performance, and sustain that level for an acceptable period of time” (INCOSE, 
2012). Gunderson and Pritchard (2002) defined engineering resilience as “the speed of 
return of the engineering system to the steady state following a perturbation, which 
implies a focus on the efficiency of the function”. In general, however, no common 
definition or quantitative approach has been adopted for resilience (Henry and Ramirez-
Marquez, 2012).  
Resilience for the purposes of this dissertation will incorporate the concept of 
vulnerability and its assessment. However, the transportation sector generally does not 
build infrastructure for the “maximum of maximums” or extreme cases. For example, the 
resources needed to make infrastructure withstand an asteroid collision is not feasible, 
therefore the term resilience captures the infrastructure’s ability to withstand threats of 
types and intensities that can be reasonably expected, given its location and 
characteristics. General steps of vulnerability assessment include: identifying critical 
assets to be assessed, assessing vulnerabilities and criticality, assessing consequences, 
identifying countermeasures, and estimating the costs of these countermeasures (Venna 
and Fricker, 2009). The importance of infrastructure vulnerability analysis has been 
accentuated by the increasing realization that greater attention needs to be paid to 
infrastructure monitoring in order to prevent unexpected and catastrophic failure since 
infrastructure vulnerability is further exacerbated by inadequate condition (Kumar et al., 
2011). The U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee quantifies about 
70,000 bridges as structurally deficient out of the total 600,000 bridges on the National 
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Highway System (USCG, 2010). Patidar et al. (2008) argued that geo-hazard 
vulnerability should be duly considered in prioritization processes. If a bridge or other 
infrastructure is structurally deficient or functionally obsolete, the vulnerability to geo-
hazards is higher (Kumar et al., 2011).   
Informed decisions regarding vulnerability assessment and emergency response 
are essential for secure and safe operation of highway assets (Venna and Fricker, 2009). 
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) created the Guide 
to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection to 
accompany the Guide to Updating Highway Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist 
Incidents (SAIC, 2002). The vulnerability assessment methods in the guide are adaptable 
to any State DOT, regardless of their critical infrastructure protection plan and help with 
assessing the vulnerability of highway transportation assets.  
A vulnerability index (protective measures index) was developed by Fisher and 
Norman (2010) to compare differing protective measures. A resilience index was also 
developed to assess a site’s resilience and consists of three primary components: 
robustness, resourcefulness, and recovery. Third, a criticality index that determines the 
importance of a facility and includes economic, human, governance, and mass evacuation 
impacts was developed. These indices were developed for the Enhanced Critical 
Infrastructure Protection initiative that DHS protective security advisers implement 
across the nation at critical facilities (Fisher and Norman, 2010).   
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2.4. Exposure and Consequences 
Consequence is a function of the effect on the community (injuries, lives lost) and 
the natural and built-up environment (ecological resources, man-made facilities) if the 
infrastructure is damaged due to a threat as well as the infrastructure’s exposure to the 
threat (Labi, 2014). Figure 2.2 provides a visual of the effect of consequences to civil 
infrastructure on its surrounding environment (Labi et al, 2011). Consequence assessment 
involves the nature of the threat and the impact of the loss of the asset (Steffey, 2008). 
The consequence associated with an event occurring can be described in multiple ways, 
and assessing these consequences can be in the form of the dollar value of resources 
damaged or destroyed and cost of repair, replacement, or substitution (Venna and Fricker, 
2009). Consequences associated with asset failure may include loss of life and property, 
loss of infrastructure needed to support economic activity, military deployment, or the 
ability to respond effectively to other emergencies (SAIC, 2002). ASCE SEI determined 
that the evaluation of consequence of failure requires the assessment of: i) the cost of 
maintenance/ repair/ replacement of the system; ii) user cost and safety; iii) the failure 
impact on local and regional economic activity, and; iv) the political ramification to the 






Figure 2.2. Impacts on the Surrounding Environment due to Infrastructure Threats 
 
The New Mexico Environmental Finance Center states: “in terms of the 
consequence of failure, it is important to consider all of the possible costs of failure 
including: cost of repair, social cost associated with the loss of the asset, 
repair/replacement costs related to collateral damage caused by the failure, legal costs 
related to additional damage caused by the failure, environmental costs created by the 
failure, and any other associated costs or asset losses” (EFC, 2006). Variables to assess 
consequences include (Venna and Fricker, 2009): 
• Fatalities/Casualties – Dead and injured as a result of the event.  
• Mission Downtime/Degradation – Time the facility is unable to continue 
operation at full capacity or at all.  
• Economic Impact – Direct economic impact on the facility to repair or replace 
(not including lawsuits, etc.).  
• Downstream Effects – The extent of the downstream impact on the transportation 
system. 
“Judgment of the relative importance of assets proceeds on the basis of critical 
factors such as casualty risk, potential effects on government continuity and emergency 
response, the military importance of the asset, economic impact, and the availability of 
alternative resources to perform an asset’s primary function” (Steffey, 2008). Assessing 
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criticality requires an examination of the likelihood of failure and the consequence of 
failure; the assets that have the greatest likelihood of failure and the greatest 
consequences associated with the failure will be the assets that are the most critical (EFC, 
2006). The IIMM defines critical assets as those where the consequences of an event 
occurring are high, but are not always associated with a high probability of occurrence 
(Hooper et al., 2009). Core asset management necessitates the identification of critical 
assets. To determine criticality, two pertinent questions must be answered, (i) how likely 
the asset is to fail and (ii) what is the consequence if the asset does fail. The data 
available to assist in determining whether an asset will fail includes: asset age, condition 
assessment, failure history, historical knowledge, experiences with that type of asset in 
general, and knowledge regarding how that type of asset is likely to fail (EFC, 2006). The 
importance of criticality allows a system to manage its risk, aids in determining where to 
spend operation and maintenance dollars, and helps facilitate capital expenditures (EFC, 
2006).  
2.5. General Assessment of Risk of Infrastructure Damage 
Threat, vulnerability, and consequence information are important in risk 
assessment while risk management involves deciding which protective measures to take 
based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy (Moteff, 2005). Risk assessment has 
been defined as an overall process of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation 
by British Standard 31100 (BSI, 2011). The American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) Technical Council on Life-cycle 
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Performance, Safety, Reliability, and Risk of Structural Systems Questionnaire outlines 
risk assessment as involving the quantification of risk defined as the product of failure 
probability and failure consequence probability for systems subjected to different hazards 
or combination of hazards. Risk assessment can be strategic at the network level, tactical 
at the asset type/group level or operational at the asset level (Hooper et al., 2009).  
ASCE SEI also describes risk management as the decision-making process and 
actions taken to preempt and mitigate risk. Due to the difficulties in quantifying key 
components of risk assessment, analyses of transportation security risk typically employ 
qualitative methods in making judgments about the relative magnitudes of various risk 
scenarios (Steffey, 2008). Quantitative risk assessment is an important growing 
component of the larger field of risk assessment that includes priority setting and 
management of risk (Melnick and Everitt, 2008). Risk information is useful for 
emergency managers and first responders when creating evacuation or emergency 
response routes. With quantitative risk information, legislative officials would have the 
ability to identify areas of concert and allocate resources appropriately.   
The Oxford English Dictionary (online) defines risk as “(Exposure to) the 
possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or 
situation involving such a possibility.” Risk is typically a multidimensional concept 
which is often expressed as the Cartesian product in the context of risk analysis for 
critical infrastructure (McGill et al., 2008) as shown in Equation 1. The definitions of risk 
vary, but in relation to infrastructure asset management, a risk definition should involve 





Risk = threat•vulnerability•consequence (1) 
 
Where threat is a set of adverse initiating events, consequence is the spectrum of losses 
that can be felt by the victims following their occurrence, and vulnerability is a set of 
system of target weaknesses that can be exploited by an adversary to achieve a given 
degree of loss. 
A threat-based risk analysis approach begins with a predefined set of threat 
scenarios based on assumed adversary capabilities justified by intelligence and proceeds 
through the analysis of vulnerability and consequence constrained by the definition and 
scope of these threats (McGill et al., 2007). This approach is suitable for studying hazards 
that are well understood and whose rate of occurrence can be reasonably predicted from 
historical data. Asset-driven risk analysis assesses the consequences and probability of 
adversary attack for an exhaustive set of plausible threat scenarios without regard to their 
probability of occurrence, and then overlays threat likelihood based on the relative 
attractiveness of alternative threat scenarios to obtain an estimate of total risk (McGill et 
al., 2007). This approach brings all plausible threat scenarios to attention in an attempt to 
defeat the potential for surprise attack without regard to adversary intent.  
The model described above is the currently accepted model of risk assessment, 
but there is room for improvement. The concept of asset resilience should be incorporated 
into the security quantification equation as a separate factor focusing on the 
characteristics of the asset. Probability of threat would capture the probability of a threat 
happening, while the concept of resilience would capture the asset specific 
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characteristics. Furthermore, uncertainty should be incorporated into the risk analysis to 
capture the range of possible consequences affecting a specific asset.   
2.6. Specific Methodologies for Assessing Risk of Infrastructure Damage 
At the asset level, strategic and tactical risk assessment is useful to identify 
critical assets that require risk assessment. When not all assets require risk assessment in 
a larger group of assets, strategic risk assessment is acceptable with tactical risk 
assessment where needed (Hooper et al., 2009). In the transportation sector, some of the 
commonly used methodologies include: Analytical Risk Methodology (ARM), Maritime 
Sector Risk Analysis Methodology (MSRAM), DHS Transit Risk Analysis Methodology 
(DHS-TRAM), CARVER, Sandia National Labs Risk Assessment Methodologies 
(RAM), and the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM). 
The plethora of methodologies has resulted partly from a lack of precision in the 
formulation of data collection elements and a less-than-rigorous quality review of process 
by the government and security industry; what works in the closed and highly regulated 
aviation sector from the standpoint of SVA would not transfer well to the open and 
ubiquitous public transit system (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). A security vulnerability 
assessment would be more beneficial if conducted by a trained team of security 
professionals using an industry-accepted methodology rather than a self-assessment 
questionnaire or checklist.   
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2.6.1. National Infrastructure Protection Plan Risk Assessment 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan proposed a methodology to assess the 
risk to critical infrastructure defined as assets, systems, and networks deemed vital to the 
USA, whose incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, 
economy, public health, or safety (DHS, 2010). The risk assessment methodology has 
three main components: vulnerability, resilience, and criticality which help determine 
comprehensive, cost-effective, and coordinated programming to manage the resiliencies 
and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. Risk is defined as a function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence of the failure of a critical infrastructure facility. In this 
case, resilience is included in the consequence factor. The risk is illustrated using a 
bowtie representation (Figure 2.3) originally developed to assess chemical processes 
which combines events and consequence trees, and allows characterization of pre- and 
post-event elements (Philley, 2006). It is used to explain the relationship between 





Figure 2.3. Risk Bowtie (Philley, 2006) 
 
In this model, vulnerability is the capability of the system to resist a threat which 
is directly linked to the protective measures in place and the state of the system when the 
threat occurs. Resilience is the capability of the system to avoid or reduce the 
consequences set in motion when a threat event is successful and is also linked to the 
state of the system. Finally, criticality represents the severity of the consequences to the 
facility, the system, and the community. With these definitions, the bowtie scheme 
enables the entire spectrum of risk to be represented for a specific facility and/or allows 
explanation of the different types of measures that can be used to manage this risk and to 






Figure 2.4. Risk Matrix (Fisher and Norman, 2010) 
 
The indices used in the methodology can be plotted as seen in Figure 2.4. to help 
decision-makers visualize which facilities have the highest relative risk. The vulnerability 
index is on the y-axis, the resilience index is on the x-axis, and the criticality index is 
represented by a circle (the larger the circle, the greater the consequence). Facilities with 
the highest relative risk are identified by high vulnerability, low resilience and high 
criticality. Low relative risk is represented by facilities with low vulnerability, high 
resilience, and low criticality. The example in Figure 2.4. indicates that facilities 1 and 7 
should be brought to the attention of the agency that oversees their security. These 
facilities have the lowest resilience, highest vulnerability, and highest criticality.    
2.6.2. AASHTO Vulnerability Assessment Method 
The AASHTO Vulnerability Assessment method is a guide for agencies to 
develop a vulnerability assessment method based on AASHTO’s outlined steps. The 
    Consequence Magnitude  
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methodology focuses on subjectively assigning values to factors associated with asset 
criticality and vulnerability. Asset criticality and vulnerability scores are transformed into 
X and Y coordinates respectively and plotted to determine asset importance. Examples of 
criticality factors range from deter/defend factors to consequence to general public 
factors (SAIC, 2002). Assets are then prioritized based on the subjective values assigned 
to each factor in Table 2.1 using Equation 2 below.  
Table 2.2. Critical Asset Scoring (SAIC, 2002) 
 
Critical Asset Critical Asset Factor Total Score (x) 
Asset 1 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor m  
Asset 2       
Asset 3       




	 =   ∙ 100  (2) 
 
Where x is the total criticality score for asset n; and Cmax is the highest criticality score 
attainable.   
Vulnerability in the AASHTO vulnerability assessment is broken into three 
factors: Visibility and Attendance, Access to the Asset, and Site Specific Hazards (SAIC, 
2002). Each factor is broken into two sub-factors and again given subjective values on a 
scale of one to five. The sub-factors for each main factor are then multiplied together and 
those results are added together as seen in Equation 3 below. 
	
	 =  ∙ ! +  ∙ # + $ ∙   (3) 
 
Where A and B are sub-factors of Factor 1; C and D are sub-factors of Factor 2; and E 
and F are sub-factors of Factor 3. 




Table 2.3.Vulnerability Factor Scoring (SAIC, 2002) 
 
Critical Asset Vulnerability Factor Total Score (y) 
(A         *      B)     +     (C       *     D)   +    (E        *       F) 
Subjective 
Value Range 
1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 
Asset 1        
Asset 2        
Asset 3        




	% =  &' ∙ 100 (4) 
 
Where Vmax is the highest attainable vulnerability score; and y is the vulnerability total 
score for asset n. 
The assets are then plotted in the following coordinate system (Figure 2.5) and 




Figure 2.5. AASHTO Vulnerability Assessment 
 
Consequence assessment is to be assumed from the graph in Figure 1 based on the 
X and Y coordinates and their factors and sub-factors. The method goes further by listing 
possible countermeasures broken down into countermeasure functions of deter, detect, 
and defend to be considered for the assets that fall in quadrant 1. Again, choosing 
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countermeasures is a subjective process based on the countermeasure functions and 
decision-maker. Finally, the countermeasures listed are given high, medium, and low 
rankings based on operational costs to help in the selection process.   
A vulnerability assessment for rural transportation networks was assessed by 
Nachtmann et al. 2007 who selected AASHTO’s vulnerability guide as the most robust 
vulnerability assessment tool. An alternative vulnerability assessment was also developed 
that included the Analytic Hierarchy Process to provide importance rankings within 
AASHTO’s framework as a modification. The AASHTO methodology for risk 
management is quite subjective and uses surveys to obtain data (Venna and Fricker, 
2009). Additionally, vulnerability and criticality are the only major factors included in the 
method to determine asset security importance, while concepts such as resilience are not 
(Dojutrek et al, 2014). Further, the method defines vulnerability and criticality as separate 
entities, but the concepts are quite similar. If an asset is vulnerable, then it has high 
criticality and vice versa.     
2.6.3. TMSARM Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool 
The TMSARM Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool developed by the 
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) is a self-assessment tool that guides a user 
through a series of security-related questions to develop a comprehensive security 
baseline of a transportation asset and assists users in the development of a comprehensive 
security plan. The user is then prompted to assess the baseline security system 
effectiveness in response to specific threat scenarios. The effectiveness is then reassessed 
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based upon the addition of countermeasures in response to conditions of heightened 
threat. The method was originally developed for maritime vulnerability and risk 
assessment for the U.S. Coast Guard’s regulatory efforts promulgated the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 (Coast Guard, 2003). A requirement of the 
MTSA is that any facility or vessel that may be involved in a transportation security 
incident should conduct a vulnerability assessment and submit a security plan to the U.S. 
Coast Guard. The MTSA defines a transportation security incident as “a security incident 
that results in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system 
disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area” (Federal Register, 2002). The tool 
is available to company security officers, vessel security officers, and facility security 
officers. This tool has restricted access and is available only to certain companies and 
agencies (Venna and Fricker, 2009). 
2.6.4. CARVER+Shock Vulnerability Assessment Tool 
The CARVER method was originally developed as an offensive target analysis 
tool that was used by the Army Special Forces for mission planning based on a 
commander’s objectives (Clark and Philpott, 2011). The method allowed the U.S. 
military to identify areas within critical or military infrastructure that are vulnerable to an 
attack. CARVER identifies six vulnerability factors (FDA, 2009): 
• Criticality - measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack 
• Accessibility - ability to physically access and egress from target  
• Recuperability - ability of system to recover from an attack  
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• Vulnerability - ease of accomplishing attack 
• Effect - amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production 
• Recognizability - ease of identifying target 
The factors are subjectively assigned a value on the scale of 0 to 10 (NIICIE, 
2007). The overall vulnerability score of a single target is the sum of the scores assigned 
to the seven criteria and can be compared to rank the vulnerability of the different targets 
relative to each other. The targets with the highest total rating have the highest potential 
vulnerability and should be considered for countermeasures (FDA, 2009). It accounts for 
target components of the target system and is applicable to features outside of 
transportation. This method was the standard security vulnerability assessment tool for 
many years before it was further developed into the CARVER+Shock method. The 
CARVER+Shock method added an additional factor of “Shock” to the factors. Shock 
incorporates the combined health, economic, and psychological impacts of an attack on 
the target system (FDA, 2009). Psychological impact is influenced by a large number of 
deaths if the target has historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic significance and if 
victims are members of a sensitive subpopulation such as children (FDA, 2009).  
Federal agencies, such as the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have utilized the CARVER+Shock method to 
evaluate the potential vulnerabilities of farm-to-table supply chains of various food items. 
This method is useful when assessing the potential vulnerabilities of individual 
processing facilities (FDA, 2009). This methodology is popular as local governments 
seek to leverage simple analysis tools to derive security-related information. It provides a 
“quick and dirty” means to rank potential targets based on vulnerability. However, 
33 
 
McGill and Ayyub (2007) pointed out that its additive and inherently non-probabilistic 
nature does not produce results that can support security risk assessment.  
2.6.5. Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model 
The Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) is a risk analysis tool 
employed by the U.S. Coast Guard. Similar to other methods, MSRAM assesses risk in 
terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. As a tool, MSRAM enables Federal 
Maritime Security Coordinators and Area Maritime Security Committees to perform 
detailed scenario risk assessments on all maritime critical infrastructure (DHSa, 2010). 
The model is used to inform strategic and tactical risk decision-making. The 
methodology is designed to capture the security risk facing various targets and assets that 
span multiple sectors. MSRAM is a scenario-based tool that evaluates threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences and considers mitigating options. This method facilitates 
operational planning and resource allocation, prioritization of sector assets, and a risk-
based evaluation of port security grant proposals. Expanding the capabilities of MSRAM 
is an ongoing priority for the maritime mode (DHSa, 2010). 
2.6.6. TCM Risk Assessment Method 
The TMC Risk Assessment Methodology (TCM RAM) is a combination from 
three different sources, the Systematic Assessment of Facility Risk (SAFR), a separate 
methodology developed by the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness toolkit, and ideas 
from AASHTO's Guide (SAIC, 2005). The steps in this method include: asset 
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identification, threat assessment, consequence assessment, vulnerability assessment, and 
countermeasure development. It evaluates risk using the following equation: 
(( = ) ∙ ) ∙  ∙ 1 − +# ∙ 1 − +, (5) 
 
Where RR (Relative Risk ) is a function of the overall threat to the asset or facility, T; the 
attractiveness of a particular target to a given adversary, TA; the potential consequences 
of a successful attack on a target, C; the ability to deter an adversary from attempting an 
attack, LD (expressed in terms of the inability to deter, or 1-LD); and the effectiveness of 
the system to prevent an attack should one be attempted, LS (expressed in terms of 
system ineffectiveness, or 1-LS).   
Calculating the relative risk to one asset has limited value since it only indicates 
the risk to that asset relative to the highest and lowest possible RR (Venna and Fricker, 
2009). The TMC RAM is a theoretically good model, but requires a lot of expert effort to 
quantify the value of subjective criteria which could input inconsistency and variance into 
the model. This method evaluates vulnerability and criticality in terms of relative risk and 
target attractiveness (Venna and Fricker, 2009).    
2.6.7. CAPTA 
The Costing Asset Protection for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) method 
identifies security-related countermeasures for assets on the basis of the extent of 
potential losses (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). CAPTA uses a consequence-based 
methodology that supports capital budgeting and resource allocation. The method 
establishes a consequence threshold for planning and resource allocation purposes rather 
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than focusing on assets, specific hazards, or threats, simplifying the risk management 
process. The main purpose of the method is to reduce risks to a level manageable by 
operating agencies based on their available budget and resources. Consequence 
thresholds are established subjectively for the risk factors that include the potentially-
exposed population, property loss, and mission disruption. This method is mainly a 
decision-informing tool for capital budgeting, not necessarily an asset specific assessment 
tool for prioritizing assets (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). It also focuses attention on 
significant, relevant assets, but eliminates those assets or asset classes whose loss of use 
would not exceed consequence thresholds, regardless of the hazard or threat from further 
consideration (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009).  
2.6.8. Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk Analysis (CAPRA) 
The critical asset and portfolio risk analysis (CAPRA) method was developed to 
consider both natural and human-caused hazards (Ayyub et al., 2007). The formula 
resembles a traditional model based on the notional product of consequence, 
vulnerability, and threat. The framework is as follows: 
Scenario IdentificationConsequence & Criticality AssessmentSecurity Vulnerability 
Assessment Hazard Likelihood Assessment Benefit/Cost Analysis Risk Informed 
Decisions 
 
Consequence and criticality assessment estimates the losses associated with each 
hazard scenario as a function of intensity. Equation 6 illustrates the consequence and 




+ = -|/ ∙ 01 − $1,-3 ∙ +1,/ ∙ 1 − $4 (6) 
 
Where Lx is the loss as a function of hazard intensity attributed to hazard scenario x; F|h 
is the fragility of the target element  due to hazard type h as a function of hazard 
intensity; EM measures the resistance of the asset’s mission to loss as a function of 
element damage; LMC,h is the maximum credible loss associated with hazard h; and ER 
measures the effectiveness of response and recovery capabilities.   
Vulnerability is taken as the probability of adversary success as a function of 
hazard intensity for a specific attack profile as seen in Equation 7: 
56,& = 01 − $6,&3 ∙ 57 ∙ 8   (7) 
 
Where PS,y is the probability of adversary success as a function of hazard intensity for a 
specified attach profile y; ES,y is the security system effectiveness with respect to the 
characteristics of attack profile y; PK is the probability that the adversary will successfully 
execute its attack on the target given failure of the security system; and Q is the 
probability distribution for hazard intensity imparted on the target (PS = Q for natural 
hazards). 
Hazard likelihood was defined as the product of the estimated annual rate of 
occurrence for a given hazard type, and for deliberate human-caused hazard. Equation 8 
below outlines the relationships. 
9& =  :,& 6, ;,/9<,/    (8) 
 
Where λy is the annual rate of occurrence associated with a given attack profile y; AP,y is 
the relative attractiveness of attack profile y; AS,x is the relative attractiveness of hazard 
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scenario x, AA,h is the relative attractiveness of the asset with respect to hazard type h; and 
λ0,h is a baseline annual rate of occurrence.  
The risk assessment portion is the combination of rate of attack, probability of 
adversary success given attack, and the loss given adversary success: 
(& = = >-|?01 − $1,-3+1,/1 − $401 − $6,&3 ∙ 8 :,& 6, ;,/∙9<,/@A< B (9) 
 
Where Ry is the annual risk associated with an attack profile y, hazard scenario x, and 
hazard type h; LMC,h is the maximum credible loss; λ0,h is the baseline annual rate of 
hazard occurrence.  
(/ = +1,//9;,/     (10) 
 
Where Rh is the total hazard risk across all hazard scenarios and profiles for a given 
hazard type; λA,h = AA,hλ0,h is the annual rate of occurrence for a given hazard affecting 
the asset; and Vh is the overall vulnerability as: 
/ = ∑  6,0∑  :,&D= >-|/01 − $1,-3 ∙ 1 − $4 ∙ 01 − $6,&38@BA< E&FG 3FHI       (11) 
   
Where the summations are taken over all hazard scenarios Xh and corresponding attack 
profiles Yx for a given hazard type h. Vulnerability can be interpreted as the degree of 
maximum credible loss following a hazard event that captures both the inherent physical 
and security weaknesses associated with different system statistics of an asset and its key 
elements (Ayyub et al., 2007).   
2.6.9. Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management Method 
The Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management (RFRM) method builds on 
hierarchical holographic modeling (Haimes et al., 2002) to identify risks then filters and 
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ranks the many sources of risks, enabling decision-makers to focus on the most critical. 
Hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) is a comprehensive framework for identifying 
real and perceived sources of risk (Leung et al., 2004). Prioritized risks are evaluated in 
the risk management phase of this method and later reviewed in order to make future 
improvements to the system (Leung et al., 2004). The phases of the method are listed 
below and most rely on interview or survey techniques to gain the necessary data to run 
each scenario.      
• Phase 1: Scenario identification through hierarchical holographic modeling 
• Phase 2: Scenario filtering based on scope, temporal domain, and level of decision 
making 
• Phase 3: Bi-criteria filtering and ranking 
• Phase 4: Multicriteria evaluation 
• Phase 5: Quantitative ranking 
• Phase 6: Risk management 
• Phase 7: Safeguarding against missing critical items 
2.6.10. Summary of Assessment Methods 
The methods described above mainly rely on the traditional risk equation which 
includes the threat, vulnerability, and consequence factors. Each method defines the 
terms in slightly different words and uses various measures to determine the levels of 
each. For example, AASHTO uses criticality and vulnerability as separate variables, but 
it could be argued that vulnerability is a function of criticality. Additionally, many of the 
methods described above rely heavily on the use of subjective data and complex data 
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collection to perform their analysis. Further, most methods did not look specifically at 
asset physical characteristics (e.g., age, material, design type). It is important to realize 
that the physical infrastructure can play a role in decreasing consequences by 
withstanding threats acting upon it. Finally, the methods described do not consider 
dynamic features throughout their frameworks and rarely mention capturing uncertainty.  
2.7. Incorporating Analytical Techniques into Risk Assessment 
A study done by Xia et al. (2004) developed a framework for risk assessment that 
includes static and dynamic infrastructure characteristics in the event of a terrorist attack. 
The risk score of a highway component is defined as a linear combination of three 
indices: 
( = ∝  + K! ∙ L<<   (12) 
 
Where R is the risk score of highway network component; A is the static characteristic 
index; B is the dynamic characteristic index; C is the attack potential index; α is the 
weight of the static characteristic index; and β is the weight of the dynamic characteristic 
index. 
The static characteristics (Index A) include: structural stability, number of 
alternatives, and response resources of highway components. The dynamic characteristics 
(Index B) include: dynamic traffic flow information such as volume, speed, occupancy, 
vehicle classification, and queue length as well as weather details and work zone 
activities. The potential of a terrorism attempt (Index C) is estimated in terms of 
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functional significance and symbolic importance of a highway component (Xia et al, 
2004).          
The score of Index A is calculated as: 
 
 = M;L + M;N + M;O + M;P (13) 
 
The score of Index B is calculated as: 
 
! = MQL + RMQN + SMQO + ℎMQP + MQU (14) 
 
The score of Index C is calculated as: 
 
 = VML + WMN (15) 
 
Where W’s are the weights predetermined with the help of experts; and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 
h, i, j, k are characteristics pertaining to each index.  
The Blue Ribbon Panel Approach to risk management first prioritizes bridge 
assets then completes a risk assessment (AASHTO, 2003). The risk assessment calculates 
risk as follows: 
( = X ∙  ∙ Y    (16) 
 
Where R is the risk to the facility; O is the occurrence or likelihood that terrorists will 
attack the asset (includes target attractiveness, level of security, access to the site, 
publicity if attacked, and the number of prior threats); V is the vulnerability or likely 
damage resulting from various terrorist threats (includes expected damage, outcome of 
the event, expected casualties, and loss of use, all features of the facility itself); and I is 
the importance or indication of consequences to the region or nation if the facility is 
destroyed.   
The formula for R expresses the interaction among the three factors, where 
dominant factors magnify risk, while negligible factors diminish it (AASHTO, 2003). 
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Different formulas fail to account for their interactive effects, such as models that add 
factors (Venna and Fricker, 2009).    
A method developed by Ray (2007) focuses on a single bridge asset and the risk 
associated with each of its many individual structural components. Within this study, risk 
is described as the relative potential for a terrorist attack against a specific component of 
the asset and the associated consequence from the attack. Factors used in the risk analysis 
include the component’s importance to overall structural stability, location and 
accessibility to terrorists, and resistance to a specific threat. Results include a rank-
ordered list of the components most at risk to an attack, which allows prioritization and 
optimization of the mitigation design for the bridge asset. The risk equation for a single 
bridge, for each of its j components exposed to threat i, is as follows: 
( = ∑DYZ ∑>X[Z[Z@E    (17) 
 
Where j is the individual bridge component; i is the threat; Oij is the measure of the 
probability of a threat i occurring against component j; Vij is the vulnerability of 
component j given the occurrence of threat i; and Ij is the importance of an individual 
component j to the bridge.   
Each factor is further broken down into weights and attribute factors which sum 
to a number between zero and one.   
YZ = ∑\]R^ ^_,(      (18) 
X[Z = ∑\]R^ ^_  (19) 
[Z = ∑\]R^ ^_   (20) 
Where wfk is the weighting factor applied to the attribute ak; ak is the attribute or specific 
unity-based criteria of varied importance that sum together to define each factor; SR is the 
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span ratio for the bridge (ratio of the span length of the part component j is attached and 
the main bridge span).  
2.7.1. Fuzzy Logic and Risk 
Fuzzy logic was used in a study by McGill and Ayyub (2007) to approximate the 
true functional relationship between the effectiveness of six security system capabilities 
(access control, personnel barriers, vehicle barriers, surveillance systems, guard force, 
and reaction force with heavy weapons) and probability of adversary success. The goal of 
the model is to provide a system based on approximate reasoning that produces an 
estimate for the probability of adversary success based on the subjective evaluation of 
several or more defensive criteria. Pr(S|Ai) is the probability of adversary success (S) 
given the occurrence of initiation event Ai and the complementary event Pr(,̅|Ai) as the 
security system effectiveness (McGill and Ayyub, 2008). Each defensive criterion (six 
security system capabilities) can take on a linguistic value of “Low,” “Medium,” or 
“High” defined on a constructed scale for effectiveness with membership functions. The 
Consequent Pr(S|A) may take on linguistic values such as “Likely,” “Certain,” or “Even 
Chance.” There is the possibility that each defensive criterion may require its own set of 
linguistic phrases for effectiveness, for example if one criterion was based on a 
constructed scale and another on a crisp scale such as time (McGill and Ayyub, 2008). A 
user (security expert) can subjectively assign a value to each premise of criterion on a 
scale of 0-10 or an alternate scale for a given facility of asset and attack type once the 
fuzzy inference rules are defined.   
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Another study by Yazdani et al., (2012) uses Fuzzy TOPSIS as a fuzzy multi-
criteria decision making technique to determine the weights of each criterion and the 
importance of alternatives with respect to criteria for risk analysis. This framework 
extends the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) 
method by introducing new parameters (“detectability” and “reaction against event”) to 
assess the effects on risk value. “Detectability” is the potential and capability for 
identification and elimination of the weakness, and “reaction against event” is the 
capability of an appropriate response in order to reduce or limit the effect of an event 
after it happens or to prevent against the development of casualties, damage, and/or loss 
(Yazdani et al, 2012). The TOPSIS method helps decision-makers carry out analysis and 
comparisons in ranking their preference of the alternatives with vague or imprecise data 
(Yazdani et al., 2012). It is based on the concept that the chosen alternative should have 
the shortest distance from the positive-ideal solution and the longest distance from the 
negative-ideal solution (Secme et al., 2009; Gummus, 2009; Sun, 2010; Yue, 2011).  
A study by Yang et al. (2009) uses a fuzzy evidential reasoning (ER) method to 
conduct maritime security assessments. Within this method, a subjective security-based 
assessment and management framework using fuzzy ER approaches was developed. The 
consequence parameter is a security parameter which can be derived from multiple risk 
parameters: will, damage capability, recovery difficulty, and damage probability. Here, 
will is the likelihood of a threat-based risk, which directly represents the lengths one goes 
through in taking a certain action. To estimate will, one may choose to use such linguistic 
terms such as “Very weak,” “Weak,” “Average,” “Strong,” and “Very strong.” The 
combination of damage capability and recovery difficulty represents the consequence 
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severity of the threat-based risk. Specifically, damage capability indicates the destructive 
force/execution of a certain action, and recovery difficulty hints at the resilience of the 
system after the occurrence of a failure or disaster (Yang et al., 2009). The following 
linguistic terms can be considered as a reference to be used in subjectively describing the 
two sister parameters: “Negligible,” “Moderate,” “Critical,” and “Catastrophic” for 
damage capability and “Easy,” “Average,” “Difficult,” and “Extremely Difficult” for 
recovery difficulty. In this case, damage probability means the probability of the 
occurrence of consequences and can be defined as the probability that damage 
consequences happen given the occurrence of the event. One may choose to use such 
linguistic terms as “Unlikely,” “Average,” “Likely,” and “Definite” to describe it (Yang 
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2007). 
2.7.2. Summary of Fuzzy Logic Methods 
Xia et al, (2004) developed a methodology to address the dynamic nature of 
specific infrastructure aspects without including uncertainty. The method developed by 
McGill and Ayyub (2008) outlined a fuzzy approach to assess the effectiveness of 
security system capabilities from the terrorist perspective but did not look specifically at 
infrastructure characteristics or the natural threat perspective. Yazdani et al, (2012) added 
two new criteria, “detectability” and “reaction against event”, into the traditional risk 
equation and input the new criteria into a fuzzy framework. Yang et al, (2009) further 
developed the variables used in the traditional risk equation to include new parameters 
based on terrorist attack for maritime transport and input these into a fuzzy evidential 
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reasoning framework. This method does not break down the variables into infrastructure 
specific subcategories.   
2.8. Risk Considerations in Project Evaluation and Programming 
Multi-criteria decision making uses any of several alternative methods including 
cost effectiveness, economic efficiency, the factor rating method, and the analytic 
hierarchy process. Economic efficiency can be calculated using the net present value, 
present worth of costs, or the benefit cost ratio. The factor rating method ranks different 
criteria based on subjective weighting. The analytic hierarchy process uses matrix 
multiplication of criteria weights to each alternative weight to derive the best option. The 






Figure 2.6. Steps for Conducting Multi-Criteria Optimization (Sinha and Labi, 2007). 
 
Cellucci (2010) developed a method to prioritize proposed programs and projects 
for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The method uses a Program Prioritization 
Index (PPI), a simple metric to evaluate the value gained from pursuing certain proposed 
programs relative to others. It is a value-based model that captures the relative utility of 
one program over another by incorporating a utilitarian approach to provide the most 
“good” for the most people and property, while recognizing both political sensitivity and 
risk and cost-saving factors. The first factor incorporates the people protected from 
potential threat (typical occurrence). Points for this factor are assigned to the following 
number of people potentially protected: assign zero for zero people; one for 1-10 people; 
two for 11-100; three for 101-500 people; four for 501-1000 people; and five for 1001-
100,000 people and an additional point for each 20,000 people potentially protected. The 
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second factor incorporates property protected from potential threat. The points for this 
factor are assigned to every $50M of property protected and the positive political impact 
generated (societal perception) as a result of a program/project’s implementation. Zero 
points are assigned for “low”; five points for “medium”; and ten points for “high.” The 
third factor incorporates the cost savings realized by DHS upon full implementation of 
the program where one point is assigned for each $1,000,000 saved (includes personnel 
plus resources). Finally, the last factor incorporates dollars requested/spent by DHS on 
the program/project where one point is assigned for each $1,000,000. 
 
The PPI calculation is: 
 
55Y = ;aQaabc  (21) 
 
Where A is the people protected points; B is the property protected points; C is the 
societal perception points; D is the cost savings points; and E is the dollars 
requested/spent.  
The higher the PPI value, the more value it potentially returns for a given DHS 
investment. For a risk-adjusted PPI, the PPI is multiplied by the “probability of success” 
of the program/project (e.g., obtain all stated objective(s)/specification(s)) expressed in a 
fraction ranging from 0% probability of success (0.0) to 100% probability (1.0). For 
example, 0.5 would relate to a 50% probability of success. 
McGill et al. (2007) used the benefit-cost ratio technique to assess the cost 
effectiveness of proposed countermeasures and consequence mitigation strategies. In this 
case, the benefit of a risk mitigation action is the difference between the values of loss, 
conditional risk, or total annual risk before and after its implementation.   
48 
 
In planning for infrastructure security, many uncertainties arise pertaining to 
threat likelihood. Not planning for this uncertainty could lead to less-than-optimal 
decision-making. An inaccurate prediction of threat likelihood raises the risk of failure 
for infrastructure, therefore increasing the potential consequences. Uncertainty in 
accounting for security of infrastructure may also result in biased selections of alternative 
improvements and errant project prioritization. By making risk-informed decisions, 
stakeholders can more accurately compare levels of confidence against costs (Ford, 
2011). 
2.9. Gaps in the Literature 
All methodologies employ varying definitions for key terms while incorporating 
differing factors in a myriad of combinations. Many factors, such as vulnerability and 
criticality, are so similar that they should not be considered separately. Additionally, 
many key factors, such as resilience, are missing from the risk assessment methodologies 
in the literature. Without strong definitions and key factors, making a case to fund 
security enhancements for transportation infrastructure based on current methods will be 
difficult.   
As stated in a previous section, risk is a multidimensional concept which is often 
expressed as the Cartesian product in the context of risk analysis for critical infrastructure 
(McGill et al., 2008). The formula for risk expresses the interaction among the three 
factors of threat likelihood, vulnerability, and consequence, where dominant factors 
magnify risk and negligible factors diminish it (AASHTO, 2003). Different formulas, 
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such as models that add factors, fail to account for the factor interaction effects (Venna 
and Fricker, 2009).    
2.10. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a literature review of current risk assessment steps and 
methodologies. First, risk assessment was defined and the terms associated in quantifying 
risk were detailed. The different classifications of threat type were described and threat 
likelihood was characterized as the probability that an external or internal threat will 
occur. Resilience was outlined as a function of vulnerability and consequence as well. 
Various methods in the literature were analyzed for their robustness, and gaps were 
identified for future improvement. The next chapter illustrates the dissertation’s 
framework for filling the gaps found in the literature review.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Section 2.8., traditional transportation infrastructure project 
evaluation uses a variety of performance measures that are related to the transportation 
asset, its operations, and its environment but does not consider directly possible reduction 
in the infrastructure damage and the resulting consequences in the event of a disaster. 
During the prioritization of investments, assets of low security do not receive the due 
attention they deserve. By incorporating the threat likelihoods, asset resilience, and 
disaster consequences, this chapter is based on the premise that the inclusion of these 
considerations in evaluation and prioritization introduces a much needed element of 
robustness in such tasks. However, the inclusion of security as a performance measure 
leads to an increase in the number of performance measures for the investment 
evaluation. Also, there is some uncertainty or variability associated with the threat 
occurrence, asset resilience, and disaster consequences. For these two reasons 
respectively, the framework presented in this chapter incorporates elements of multiple 
criteria decision making and fuzzy logic. This chapter presents a methodology to quantify 
the overall security level for an asset in terms of the threats it faces, its resilience to 
damage from such threats, and the consequences of the infrastructure damage if the threat 
occurs. The overall framework consists of the traditional steps in risk management and 
the specific contribution is in the part of the framework that measures the risk. 
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3.2. Proposed Definition of Security 
For this dissertation, security can be defined as a function of threat likelihood, 
asset resilience and damage consequences. The security of a transportation asset is the 
lack of risk of damage from threats due to inherent structural or functional resilience. 
3.3. Framework 
The proposed security rating developed in this dissertation has three main inputs 
which are integral to risk assessment: threat likelihood, asset resilience, and disaster 
consequence. The output, security rating index, can be used to help in prioritizing assets 
for optimal security enhancement funding and for use in multi-criteria project evaluation 
(Figure 3.1).     
 
 




The definitions of the key inputs and terminology used in this dissertation are defined in 
Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. Terminology for Proposed Framework 
 
Term  Definition  
Asset Specific transportation infrastructure  
Resilience  The ability of the asset to withstand and recover from the threat  
Threat 
Likelihood  
The probability of a threat occurring that effects the 
asset  
Consequence  The effects of the failure of an asset and its associated 
costs and damages  
Factor Plays an integral role in quantifying security of an asset 
Measure Quantifies how much the factor contributes to asset 
security 
Attribute Level of the measure rated on a scale to define the 
overall amount that the measure contributes to the factor 
3.4. Security Factors 
Each of the three main security factors (threat likelihood, asset resilience, and 
damage consequences) has measures that quantify how much each factor contributes to 
the overall security of an asset. Each measure is further decomposed into attributes that 
indicate the level of the measure rated on a scale to define the overall amount that the 
measure contributes to the security factor. Since the attributes of each measure have 
different units, the attribute data was scaled to account for these differences. 
Additionally, each measure is weighted for importance; therefore, a decision-maker can 





Each security factor is calculated as follows: 
 
d = ]L ∙ eL +⋯+]g ∙ eg (22) 
f = 1….3 
n = 1…n 
 
Where Ff is a security factor; wn is the weight/importance of measure n; and Mn is a 
measure of security factor Ff. 
Each measure for a security factor follows the formulation below. Attributes that 
comprise a security measure are multiplied together and divided by the total number of 






Where Mn is a measure of security factor Ff; si is an attribute that contributes to the level 
of measure Mn, rated on a scale to define the overall amount that measure n contributes to 
the risk factor, Ff; and Ns is the number of attributes associated with measure n.  
The detailed framework can be visualized in Figure 3.2. Each factor is shown 
with specific measures and each measure has associated attributes for the purpose of this 




             f = 3          M = n    s = s 
 
Figure 3.2. Detailed Framework 
3.4.1. Methodology for Assessing Threat Likelihood 
Threats to an asset can be categorized into three main groups: natural, man-made 
unintentional, and man-made intentional. Each of these groups contains many different 
















Table 3.2. Examples of Threats to Transportation Infrastructure 
 






















Historical Data  Historical Data Predictive models Literature  
 
The measures associated with the threat likelihood factor in this study are the ease 
of access to the asset and location-specific hazards, such as earthquakes or floods. The 
following equation gives weights to each measure associated with the threat likelihood 
factor for an overall effect of threat likelihood on the security of an asset.  
Lopq = ]L ∙ eL +⋯+]g ∙ eg (24) 
 
Where FTL is the threat likelihood factor; w1, wn are the weight/importance for each threat 
likelihood measure; and M1, Mn are measures of threat likelihood. 
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The following equation 






Where Mnis a measure for threat likelihood; si are the scaled attributes for measure n; and 




Each attribute is then scaled between one and five to account for different units of 
measure of each attribute for the purpose of the case study. These scales can be further 
refined by representative utility functions or value functions for each attribute. For 
example, the attributes could be scaled as shown Table 3.3., where a rating of five 
indicates a low level of contribution to the associated factor and one indicates a high level 
of contribution to the associated factor.   
Table 3.3. Example Attribute Scale 
 
Sample Attribute Levels  Scale  
<50%  1  





Resilience is the ability of an asset to maintain essential functions with little or no 
disruption and to recover quickly when/if disrupted. The measures associated with the 
resilience factor in this study are how resistant the asset is to threats, the asset’s ability to 
recover from a threat, and the asset characteristics. The following equation gives weights 
to each measure associated with the resilience factor for an overall effect of resilience on 





No4 = ]L ∙ eL +⋯+]g ∙ eg (26) 
 
Where FR is the resilience factor; w1, wn are the weight/importance for each resilience 
measure; and M1, Mn are measures of resilience. 
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The resistance measure has 
two attributes, asset condition and asset age. Asset condition is defined as the physical 
asset condition of asset components. Asset age is defined as the age of the asset in year t. 




      (27) 
 
Where Mn is a measure for the resilience factor; si are the scaled attributes for measure n; 
and Nattribute is the total number of attributes for measure n.  
Each attribute is then scaled between one and five to account for different units of 
measure. In terms of resilience, a rating of five would indicate a high level of 
contribution to resilience and one would indicate a low level of contribution to resilience, 
opposite of the threat likelihood and consequence attribute scales.  
3.4.3. Consequence 
Consequence is the outcome of a threat towards a specific asset in terms of the 
damage to its surroundings. The following equation gives weights to each measure 
associated with the consequence factor for an overall effect of consequence on the 





Oo = ]L ∙ eL +⋯+]g ∙ eg (28) 
 
Where FC is the consequence factor; w1, wn are the weight/importance for each 
consequence measure; and M1, Mn are measures of consequence. 
The measures are further broken down into their attributes. The following 




      (29) 
 
Where Mn is a measure for the consequence factor; si are the scaled attributes for measure 
n; and Nattribute is the total number of attributes for measure n. 
Each attribute is then scaled between one and five to account for different units of 
measure. A rating of five indicates a low level of contribution to the consequence factor 
and one indicates a high level of contribution to the consequence factor.   
3.5. Security Rating 
The security rating equation can take any one of several forms. Also, there are 
several ways by which the constituent factors could be weighted. For example, addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, a ratio, or some combination of the above: (i) ,( = pq +
 − 4; (ii) ,( = pq ∙  − 4; (iii) ,( = pq ∙  ∙ 4; (iv) ,( = rst∙rurv ; (v) ,( =
]Lpq +  − ]N4; (vi) ,( = pq∝ ∙ w − 4x. Where SR is the security ratio; FTL is 
the threat likelihood factor; FC is the consequence factor; FR is the resilience factor; and 
w1, w2, α, β, λ are factor weights. For purposes of this study, the security rating equation 









   (30) 
 
SRa = security rating for asset a  
FTLa = threat likelihood factor of asset a 
FCa = consequence factor of asset a  
FRa = resilience factor of asset a 
α = exponential weight of the resilience factor  
δ = exponential weight of the threat likelihood factor 
λ = exponential weight of the consequence factor 
This form was chosen due to its ability to be understandably interpreted. The 
security factor of resilience, which has a positive connotation in terms of security, is 
divided by the security factors of consequence and threat likelihood, which have negative 
connotations in terms of security. An asset with high resilience would presumably be able 
to withstand a potential hazard therefore increasing its security level. An asset with large 
potential consequences and large threat likelihood would be associated with a lower 
security level. By formulating the equation in this arrangement, the larger the resilience 
and the smaller the consequences and threat likelihood, the greater the ratio. This would 
imply a high security rating. For example, if asset resilience increases due to 
improvements, threat likelihood is predicted to be low, and consequences decrease due to 
people moving away from the surrounding area, the security rating would increase. 
Therefore, the greater the security rating, the more secure the asset is. Each factor can be 
graphed against each other to identify assets of importance for security improvements to 






Figure 3.3. Threat Likelihood-Resilience Nomograph 
 
In Figure 3.3., asset A has a high threat likelihood, indicating that a threat is 
imminent in the near future, and low resilience which would indicate the asset is not 
prepared for the oncoming threat. For example, if an asset was located in an area with a 
propensity for landslides and had not been brought up to code recently, the asset has a 
higher chance of failure. This asset would be of high importance to agencies and 
stakeholders when determining the prioritization for security improvements. 
Alternatively, Asset C has low threat likelihood and high resilience, making this asset 
prepared for any low probability threat that may occur. Agencies could give this asset 
lower priority for security improvements. Asset B and C could be given a medium 
priority for improvements since they have a mixture of good and bad qualities. Asset B 
has a low probability of threat occurring but is also not very resilient. In the case that a 
threat did occur, the asset would not be prepared to withstand it. Asset D has a high 
probability of threat and high resilience, therefore the asset is prepared for the threat, but 





Figure 3.4. Consequence-Resilience Nomograph 
 
In Figure 3.4., asset G has a low consequence level and high resilience indicating 
that if a threat did occur, the asset would be able to withstand it and there would be 
minimal consequences. This asset would be given less priority than asset E. Asset E has a 
high consequence level and low resilience level. Therefore, if a threat occurred, the asset 
would not be able to withstand it; and its failure would lead to high consequences. For 
example, a bridge that has not been maintained properly, is designed poorly, and is 
located near residences with a high volume of traffic could cause great damage if it 
failed. Agencies or stakeholders would need to focus on improving this asset in order to 
make it more resilient to the threat and therefore reduce the potential consequences. 
Assets F and H have a mixture of good and bad factors that play a role in their security. 
Asset F has a low resilience level and low consequence level indicating that the asset 
could potentially fail if a threat occurred but would not cause much damage in terms of 
consequences. Asset H has a high level of consequences but counters it with a high level 
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Figure 3.5. Threat Likelihood-Consequence Nomograph 
 
In Figure 3.5., asset L has a high probability of threat occurring and high 
consequences should the asset fail. This asset should be given priority for security 
improvements to make sure it is very resilient in order to withstand the impending threats 
and lowering resulting consequences. Asset J has a low probability of threat occurring 
and low consequences, meaning it can be given a lower priority than other assets such as 
I and K which have more cause for improvements. Asset I has a high probability of threat 
occurrence but a low consequence level. This indicates that should a threat happen and 
the asset fails, the consequences would be minimal. For example, this asset may be 
located in a desert where no one resides. This means that consequences would not be 
high. Finally, asset K has a low probability of threat occurring but a high consequence 
level. If this asset failed, consequences would be devastating; but since threats are 
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minimal, it would have a low probability of failing and therefore could be placed in a 
medium priority level.     
Additionally, a three-dimensional representation can be derived from these three 
factors to better show their interactions (Figure 3.6.). An asset with high threat likelihood, 
high consequences, and low resilience (the black square) would require agencies to focus 
on this asset in order to make sure it is more resilient, reducing the consequences of 
impending threats. Assets with high resilience, low consequences, and low threat 
likelihood (the off-white square) are of lesser priority for security improvements than 




Figure 3.6. Three Dimension Representation of Security Rating Factors 
 
The security rating can be placed on a scale and interpretations made as seen in 
the below figure and table below.  
 
 










≤β  Indicates very high security improvement needs and low resilience thus immediate 
action should be undertaken to enhance resilience and thus reduce the possible 
consequences.  
β-δ Indicates high security improvement needs of the asset. The agency should be ready to 
undertake actions to enhance resilience and thus to reduce the possible consequences of 
the asset failing.  
δ-ζ Indicates medium-to-high security improvement needs. Facilities within this range can 
be monitored at a frequency slightly exceeding standard frequency. The risk of failure 
can be tolerated until a normal capital project (to enhance resilience and thus reduce 
consequences, among other benefits) is carried out.  
ζ-θ  Indicates low-to-medium security improvement needs. Unexpected failure can be 
avoided during the remaining service life of the asset by performing standard scheduled 
inspections with due attention to specific design features that influence the assets 
possible consequences.  
θ-λ  Indicates low security improvement need. Often reflective of the likelihood of threat to a 
civil engineering system built to the current design standards in a low threat likelihood 
environment.  
λ-µ Indicates little or no security improvement needs.  
 
3.5.1. Expert Opinion 
Expert opinion can be defined as the formal judgment of experts on a matter in 
which their advice is sought; an opinion could mean a judgment of a belief that is based 
on uncertain information or knowledge (Ayyub, 2001). Opinions are subjective 
assessments, evaluations, impressions, or estimations of the quality or quantity of 
something of interest that seems true, valid, or probable in the expert’s view. The first 
structured methods for expert opinion elicitation were done by the Research and 
Development Corporation (RAND) (Ayyub, 2001). Elicitation methods include: the 
indirect elicitation, direct method, and parametric estimation. Multiple methods are 
available to synthesize expert opinion: the Delphi Method, scenario analysis, scientific 
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heuristics, and rational consensus being among them. In some cases, expert opinion in the 
form of subjective probabilities of an event need to be combined into a single value or 
intervals for their use in probabilistic and risk analyses (Ayyub, 2001). To successfully 
combine the opinions of different experts there are two main methodologies: 
mathematical and consensus. Mathematical methods, specifically, are based on assigning 
equal or different weights to expert opinion (Clemen, 1989; Ferrell, 1985), while 
consensus methods rely on mutual agreement.   
Expert opinion can be used to build frequency or probability distributions when 
data is unavailable (Ford, 2011). In order to accomplish this goal, the following 
methodologies can be used: the Extended Pearson Turkey Method, Four Point Bracket 
Method, reference lotteries, and/or paired comparisons of situations (Clemen and Reilly, 
2001). When working with expert opinion, caution should be taken to remove expert 
opinion biases in the estimations. Within this framework, experts were consulted to help 
determine measures for specific factors, scales for security attributes, and fuzzy logic 
membership function ranges.   
3.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a methodology to quantify the overall security level for an 
asset in terms of threat likelihood, asset resilience, and the consequences in the event of 
system damage due to threat occurrence. This methodology addresses the risk 
measurement aspect of the traditional risk management framework. The next chapter uses 
this methodology in an asset-level case study. 
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CHAPTER 4: ASSET LEVEL CASE STUDY 
4.1. Introduction 
Asset-level analysis is important to maintain and increase the security of 
transportation networks. Infrastructure should be analyzed at the asset-level due to the 
differences between asset types, location specific characteristics, and physical 
characteristics. Each asset provides a different combination of measures and attributes 
which should be closely analyzed to gain information on an asset’s security. For example, 
an asset that is located in an area with propensity to earthquakes and near a large 
population would have a different security rating than an asset in an area with low 
earthquake occurrence and a location in the middle of a desert. Due to the range of 
combinations for each asset, an asset-level analysis must be completed to identify assets 
in need of security improvements. 
Bridge #8868, the JFK Bridge in Jeffersonville, Indiana, was chosen as a sample 
case study to demonstrate how the security rating function works with associated 





Figure 4.1. JFK Bridge, Structure No. 8868, Clark County, Jeffersonville, IN 
4.2. Data and Assumptions 
Data was taken from the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) database for the state of 
Indiana for Bridge No. 8868. Assumptions were made to carry out the case study. The 
construction time was based on the bridge size. Earthquakes were identified as the threat 
for the example and the probability of earthquake threat was equal to the amount of 
historical earthquake epicenters found in the county the asset resides in. Environmental 
barriers were assumed to be waterways under a bridge and physical barriers were 
assumed to be roadways under the bridge. The detour travel speed was assumed to be 
45mph and all weights in the security rating equation (α, δ, λ) were assumed to be equal.   
4.3. Factor Analysis 
4.3.1. Threat Likelihood Factor Computation for the JFK Bridge Case Study 
The measures associated with the threat likelihood factor in this case study are the 
ease of access to the asset and location-specific hazards, which include earthquakes or 
floods. The access-to-asset measure plays a role in an asset’s security and is pertinent 
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when considering terrorist attacks. Some infrastructure hold iconic status to a country or 
group. This symbolic infrastructure could therefore be targeted by terrorists for the 
devastating impact of losing such a meaningful structure. The location-specific data, 
which focuses on location of an asset and what hazards are typical in that area, will be 
different depending on where each asset is situated. The following equation gives weights 
to each measure associated with the threat likelihood factor for an overall effect of threat 
likelihood on the security of an asset.  
pq = ]y}}~iiyii~ ∙ ey}}~iiyii~ + ]}y[g ∙ e}y[g (31) 
 
Where FTL is the threat likelihood; waccess-to-asset is the weight/importance for access 
measure; Maccess-to-asset is the access to asset measure; wlocation is the weight/importance of 
the asset location; Mlocation is the location specific hazards measure. 
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The access-to-asset 
measure has two attributes: environmental barriers and physical barriers. Environmental 
barriers are natural barriers that keep the public and vehicles away from an asset; physical 
barriers are man-made barriers that keep the public and vehicles away from an asset. The 






Where Maccess-to-asset is the access-to-asset measure; senvironmental is the environmental 
barrier scaled attribute; sphysical is the physical barrier scaled attribute; and Nattribute is the 






The access-to-asset attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.1.  




Scale   Physical Barriers  Scale  
None  5   None  5  
One  3   One  3  
2+  1   2+  1  
 
The location-specific hazards measure could have the following attributes: natural 
hazards, freeze index, and precipitation. Natural hazards are defined as location-specific 
hazards such as earthquakes or hurricanes. The freeze index is the cumulative number of 
degree-days when air temperatures are below and above zero degrees Celsius in the area 
around the asset. Precipitation is measured in 100th inches of rainfall at the asset location. 
The following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the location-specific 






Where Mlocation is the location-specific hazards measure; snatural is the natural hazard 
scaled attribute; sfreeze is the county freeze index scaled attribute; sprecipitation is the county 
precipitation scaled attribute; and Nattribute is the number of attributes for the location 
specific hazards measure.  











(% chance of hazard)  
Scale   Freeze Index  Scale   Precipitation 
(100
th
 inches)  
Scale  
<50%  1   <115  1   <37  1  
51%-74% 2   115-263  2   37-39  2  
75%-84% 3  263-462 3  39-42.4 3 
85%-94% 4  462-661 4  42.4-45 4 
95%+ 5  661+ 5  45+ 5 
 
Threat likelihood data for the JFK Bridge are shown in Table 4.3. The threat 
likelihood factor equates to 2.67 using the equations (34-36) for the measures shown 
below.   
Table 4.3. JFK Bridge Threat Likelihood Factor Data 
 





Env Barriers Over river 3 4.5 
 
 




Natural Hazards Earthquake epicenter 1 
1.67 County Freeze Index 30 1 











= L∙L∙UO = 1.67 (35) 
 
pq = ]y}}~iiyii~ ∙ ey}}~iiyii~ + ]}y[g ∙ e}y[g = 0.5 ∙ 4.5 + 0.5 ∙ 1.67 = 2.67   (36) 
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4.3.2. Resilience Factor Computation for the JFK Bridge Case Study 
The measures associated with the resilience of an asset are: the asset resistance to 
hazards, asset recoverability after damage, and the asset’s physical characteristics. An 
asset’s ability to resist and recover from a hazard gives an indication as to how long 
repairs will take, and therefore, how much it will cost to fix. Asset physical 
characteristics will also play a role in predicting how well an asset can withstand a 
hazard. For example, an older asset may not be up to current building codes and therefore 
not structurally advanced to withstand an earthquake or flood. The following equation 
gives weights to each measure associated with the resilience factor for an overall effect of 
resilience on the security of an asset.  
4 = ]~i[iyg}~ ∙ e~i[iyg}~ + ]~}~y[[& ∙ e~}~y[[& + ]}/yy}~[i[}i ∙
e}/yy}~[i[}i (37) 
 
Where FR is the resilience factor; wresistance is the weight/importance of asset resistance; 
Mresistance is the measure of asset resistance; wrecoverability is the importance/weight of asset 
recoverability; and Mrecoverability is the measure of asset recoverability; wcharacteristics is the 
weight/importance of asset characteristics; and Mcharacteristics is the asset characteristic 
measure. 
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The resistance measure has 
two attributes: asset condition and asset age. Asset condition is defined as the physical 
asset condition of asset components. Asset age is defined as the age of the asset in year t. 








     i = 1….I (38) 
 
Where Mresistance is the measure of asset resistance; sconditioni is the condition scaled 
attribute for i asset components; saget is the scaled attribute for asset age in year t; and 
Nattribute is the number of attributes for the resistance measure.  
The resistance attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.4. In this case, the scaled 
rating of five implies a greater contribution to resilience as opposed to the attributes 
associated with the threat likelihood and consequence factors.  




Scale   Age (years)  Scale  
7-9  5  <5  5  
6  4   5-10  4  
5  3   10-19  3  
3-4  2   19-70  2  
1-3  1   70+  1  
 
The bridge rating scale used in the NBI database is shown in Table 4.5. A 
histogram of bridge ages in Indiana is shown in Figure 4.2. These data and expert opinion 










Table 4.5. National Bridge Inventory Rating Scale 
 
Rating Description 
9 Excellent Condition 
8 Very Good Condition-no problems noted 
7 Good Condition-some minor problems 
6 Satisfactory Condition-structural elements show minor deterioration 
5 Fair Condition-all primary structural elements are sound but may have minor corrosion, 
cracking or chipping. May include minor erosion on bridge piers. 
4 Poor Condition - advanced corrosion, deterioration, cracking or chipping. Also 
significant erosion of concrete bridge piers. 
3 Serious Condition - corrosion, deterioration, cracking and chipping, or erosion of 
concrete bridge piers have seriously affected deck, superstructure, or substructure. Local 
failures are possible. 
2 Critical Condition - advanced deterioration of deck, superstructure, or substructure. May 
have cracks in steel or concrete, or erosion may have removed substructure support. It 
may be necessary to close the bridge until corrective action is taken.  
1 "Imminent" Failure Condition - major deterioration or corrosion in deck, superstructure, 
or substructure, or obvious vertical or horizontal movement affecting structure stability. 
Bridge is closed to traffic but corrective action may put back in light service. 
0 Failed Condition - out of service - beyond corrective action 
N Not applicable 




Figure 4.2. Probability Distribution of Indiana Bridge Age 
 
The recoverability measure has three attributes: construction time, construction 
cost, and asset size. Asset time is defined as the amount of time needed to reconstruct the 
asset in case of total failure. Construction cost is the amount of dollars needed to 
construct the asset. Asset size is the area the asset takes up (ft2, lane-miles). These 

















example, the greater the size of an asset, the more it will cost for materials and repairs 
and the longer it may take to fix. The following equation relates the attributes that 
contribute to the recoverability measure.  
e~}~y[[& = ij∙ikj∙iknjk  (39) 
 
Where Mrecoverability is the measure of asset recoverability; stime is the time is takes to 
reconstruct the asset; ssize is the size of the asset; scost is the construction cost of the asset; 
and Nattribute is the number of attributes for the recoverability measure.  
The recoverability attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.6. Histograms of 
construction cost and size for Indiana bridges are seen in Figures 4.3. and 4.5. This data 
and expert opinion determined the recoverability attribute scales for this case study.   
Table 4.6. Recoverability Measure Scaled Attributes 
 
Construction 
Time (yrs)  
Scale   Construction Cost  Scale   Asset Size (ft
2
)  Scale  
<0.3  5   <$1.98M  5  <11,440  5 
0.4-0.9  4  $1.98M-$4.57M  4   11,440-31,747  4  
1-2  3   $4.57M-$9.83M  3   31,748-78,373  3  
2.1-5  2  $9.83M-$21.8M  2   78,373-235,914  2  













Figure 4.4. Probability Distribution of Indiana Bridge Network Size 
 
 
The asset characteristic measure has two attributes: asset material and asset design 
type. Asset material is the dominant type of material the asset is constructed from. Asset 
design type is the design type of the asset. The following equation relates to the attributes 








































Where Mcharacteristics is the measure for asset characteristics; smaterial is the scaled attribute 
for asset material; sdesign is the scaled asset design type; and Nattributes is the number of 
attributes for the asset characteristic measure.  
The asset attribute scales for the characteristics measure are shown below. Asset 
characteristics are important for determining if an asset is resilient based on its physical 
characteristics. For example, a concrete or steel bridge may be able to withstand more fire 
damage than a timber bridge. Concrete, steel, and timber represent over 98% of the 
materials used for bridge construction in the United States (Smith et al, 1997). In a study 
by Smith et al. (1997), bridge materials were rated using expert opinion and the analytical 
hierarchy process. State department of transportation engineers, private consulting 
engineers, and local highway officials from Mississippi, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin were interviewed for their expert opinion. In each state, a group of four to 
twelve individuals were interviewed. The results showed that based on the factors of: 
performance measures of material lifespan, past performance, maintenance requirements, 
resistance to natural deterioration, initial cost, and lifecycle cost, that prestressed concrete 
was the material of choice followed by reinforced concrete, steel, and timber (Smith et al, 
1997). This study was used to determine the scale for the bridge material attribute (Table 
4.7.). Bridge types also possess positive and negative aspects of their design. It is very 
important to select the most appropriate bridge type for a site to account for cost-
effectiveness and area characteristics (USDOT, 2012). Table 4.8. below lists some 




Table 4.7. Asset Characteristic Measure Scaled Attributes 
 
Material  Scale   Design Type  Scale  
Prestressed Concrete 5  Slab  5 
Reinforced Concrete  4   Box Beam  4  
Steel  3  Stringer, Girder  3 
Other  2   Truss 2 




Table 4.8. Bridge Design Type Strengths and Limitations 
 
Bridge Type       Strengths      Limitations 
Beams • Unit cost of rolled beams low due to 
simple fabrication 
• Details less expensive 
• Economical in short span ranges 
• Higher unit weights due to 
rolled beams 
Girders • Multi-girder composite construction 
accounts for deck strength  
• Deck girders offer flexibility of 
roadway width 
• Welding led to cracks 
• Fracture critical 
• Through girder system limited 
to superstructure depth 
restriction 
Trusses • Used when unrestricted vertical 
clearance below bridge 
• Economical substructures 
• Easy to widen 
• Fracture critical 
• Widening limited to structural 
capacity 
• Not cost-effective for span 
under 450 feet 
• Labor intensive 
Cable-stayed • Edge girders carry bending between 
stay cable anchorages plus axial  
• Compressive forces additive from end 
longest cables toward towers 
• Edge girder design not 
controlled by bending but by 
compressive forces imparted 
by stay cables, requiring 
heavier section to avoid 
buckling 
Suspension • Rely on high-strength cables as major 
structural elements 
• Towers significantly shorter than those 
required for cable-stayed 
• Not economical until main 
span length exceeds 3,000 feet 
• Require large expensive steel 
castings 
• Specialized erection process 
Arch • Economical for very long spans 
• Used to cross deep valley with steep 
walls 
• High performance steel used to reduce 
fractures 
• Redundancy reduces fracture critical 
status 
• Foundation costs increase for 
deep foundations 
• Tied arches are fracture 
critical 
• Not economical after 900 feet 
length 
• Fracture critical 
• Complex to erect 




The resilience measures, attributes, and scales for the JFK Bridge can be seen in 
Table 4.9. Equations (41-44) used the data to compute each measure value and input for 
the resilience factor equation. The resilience factor equates to 9.13. 
 
Table 4.9. JFK Bridge Resilience Factor Data 
 
Measure  Attributes  Data  Scaled  Results  
Resistance  Condition  Deck: 6 4 24  
Superstructure: 5 3  
Substructure: 6 4  
Age  83 yrs  2  
Recoverability  Const. Time  2yrs  2  0.66 
Const. Cost  $45.2M  1  
Asset Size  267,466 ft2  1  
Asset 
Characteristics 
Material  Continuous steel  3  3 






= P∙O∙P∙NP = 24      (41) 
 
e~}~y[[& = ij∙ikj∙iknjk =
N∙L∙L





= O∙NN = 3 (43) 
 
4 = ]~i[iyg}~ ∙ e~i[iyg}~ + ]~}~y[[& ∙ e~}~y[[& + ]}/yy}~[i[}i ∙ e}/yy}~[i[}i 
= 0.33 ∙ 24 + 0.33 ∙ 0.66 + 0.33 ∙ 3 = 9.13 (44) 
4.3.3. Consequence Factor Computation for the JFK Bridge Case Study 
The measures associated with the consequences of bridge failure due to a hazard 
are: the potentially exposed population around the asset, the property lost due to the 
bridge failure, and the effects of mission disruption due to a closed bridge. For example, 
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people that live near the bridge may rely on the bridge to allow them to travel across a 
river, and if the bridge is closed, they may need to travel out of their way to cross the 
river on another bridge. Consequences could also arise from the bridge collapsing while 
people are traveling over it and could ruin anything under or near the bridge from falling 
debris. Additionally, the loss of a bridge will detract from an agency’s total infrastructure 
value and lead to repair costs. The following equation gives weights to each measure 
associated with the consequence factor for an overall effect of consequence on the 
security of an asset.  
 = ]y[g ∙ ey[g + ]~& ∙ e~& + ] [i[g ∙ e [i[g (45) 
 
Where FC is the consequence factor; wpopulation is the potentially exposed population 
importance; Mpopulation is the potentially exposed population measure; wproperty is the 
property loss importance; Mproperty is the property loss measure; wdisruption is the mission 
disruption importance; and Mdisruption is the measure of mission disruption.  
The measures are further broken down into their attributes. The potentially 
exposed population measure has two attributes: population around the asset and average 
daily traffic (ADT). The population around the asset is defined as the number of people in 
the area surrounding an asset. The following equation relates to the attributes that 







Where Mpopulation is the potentially exposed population measure; spopulation is the scaled 
population around the asset attribute; sADT is the average daily traffic on the asset; and 
Nattributes the number of attributes for the potentially exposed population measure.  
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The potentially exposed population attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.10. 
The county population where the asset is located was used as the potentially exposed 
population for the case study.  
Table 4.10. Potentially Exposed Population Measure Scaled Attributes 
 
ADT  Scale   County Population  Scale  
<6,920  1   <38,075  1  
6,921-17,950  2   38,076-84,964  2  
17,951-36,710 3  84,965-182,791  3 
36,711-79,520 4   182,792-484,564  4 
79,921+ 5   484,565+  5 
 
 
The property loss measure has two attributes: replacement cost and value. The 
replacement cost is the total cost to replace the asset. Value is the worth of the asset to 
stakeholders. The following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the property 
loss measure. 
e~& = ik∙injk  (47) 
 
Where Mproperty is the property loss measure; srcost is the scaled replacement cost attribute; 
svalue is the scaled asset value attribute; and Nattributes is the number of attributes for the 
property loss measure.  
The scaled property loss attributes are shown in Table 4.11. Both replacement 







Table 4.11. Property Loss Measure Scaled Attributes 
 
Replacement Cost  Scale   Value (EDMC)  Scale  
<$11,000  1   <$2.06M  1  
$10,001-$1.49M  2   $2.06M-5.5M  2  
$1.5M  3  $5.51M-$12.8M  3 
$1.5M-$119M  4  $12.81M-$38M  4 
$120M+  5  $38M+  5 
 
The mission disruption measure also has two attributes: detour length and travel 
time increase due to detour. The detour length is measured by the miles driven to travel 
around the asset to continue to a destination. Travel time increase due to the detour is the 
increase in travel time due to traveling around the failed asset. Time has no intrinsic 
value, but in terms of time saved due to arriving at a destination early, value is given to 
the ability to perform other tasks during this additional time (Sinha and Labi, 2007). In 
this case, saved travel time would provide a benefit to drivers while increased travel 
times would cost them time and energy. Therefore, mission disruption identifies increase 
in travel time due to a detour a consequence of impassable infrastructure. The following 
equation relates to the attributes that contribute to the mission disruption measure. 
e [i[g = i∙injk (48) 
 
Where Mdisruption is the mission disruption measure; sdetour is the scaled detour length 
attribute; stt is the scaled travel time increase due to the detour attribute; and Nattribute is the 
number of attributes for the mission disruption measure.  













Scale   Travel Time Inc. 
(min)  
Scale  
<2  1   <3  1  
3  2   3-5  2  
6  3  5-8  3 
8  4  8-10  4 
10+  5  10+  5 
 
The data for the JFK Bridge consequence factor can be seen in Table 4.13. The 
consequence factor equates to 4.29 using equations (49-52). 
Table 4.13. JFK Bridge Consequence Factor Data 
 




Population  Jeffersonville: 27,362 
Clark County: 96,472 
3  3  
AADT  15,200 2  
Property 
Loss  
Replacement Cost  $36.1M  4  8  
EDMC Value  $18.63M  4  
Mission 
Disruption 
Detour Length (miles)  3.11  2  2  
Inc in travel time due 
to detour  





= O∙NN = 3 (49) 
e~& = ik∙injk =
P∙P
N = 8 (50) 
e [i[g = i∙injk =
N∙N
N = 2 (51) 
 = ]y[g ∙ ey[g +]~& ∙ e~& + ] [i[g ∙ e [i[g  
= 0.33 ∙ 3 + 0.33 ∙ 8 + 0.33 ∙ 2 = 4.29 (52) 
 
The individual security factors for the JFK Bridge are graphed for further analysis 
and lie in the medium (gray) to high (dark gray) importance ranges as delineated by the 
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average factor levels of all the bridges in Indiana shown as the borders between colors 
















(c) JFK Bridge Threat Likelihood-Consequence Nomograph 
 
Figure 4.5. Security Factor Levels of JFK Bridge 
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4.4. Security Rating 
Based on the security factor outputs for the JFK Bridge using the given data, a 
security rating can be calculated in Equation 53 below. The overall security rating for the 
JFK Bridge is 1.31, a security rating of high importance as seen on the scale in Figure 
4.5. A security rating of high importance indicates that unexpected failure can be avoided 
if an agency takes immediate action to enhance the resilience of the bridge and thus 
reduce the possible consequences. The JFK Bridge would therefore need improvements 


































Example Interpretation  
≤1.67  Indicates very high security improvement needs and low resilience thus immediate 




Indicates high security improvement needs of the asset. The agency should be ready to 
undertake actions to enhance resilience and thus to reduce the possible consequences of 
the asset failing.  
3.33-
5.00 
Indicates medium-to-high security improvement needs. Facilities within this range can 
be monitored at a frequency slightly exceeding standard frequency. The risk of failure 
can be tolerated until a normal capital project (to enhance resilience and thus reduce 
consequences, among other benefits) is carried out.  
5.00-
6.68 
Indicates low-to-medium security improvement needs. Unexpected failure can be 
avoided during the remaining service life of the asset by performing standard scheduled 
inspections with due attention to specific design features that influence the assets 
possible consequences.  
6.68-
8.35  
Indicates low security improvement need. Often reflective of the likelihood of threat to a 
civil engineering system built to the current design standards in a low threat likelihood 
environment.  
8.35-10 Indicates little or no security improvement needs.  
4.5. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented an asset-level methodology to quantify the overall security 
rating for the JFK Bridge, in terms of the: threat likelihood, system resilience, and 
consequences in the event of system destruction or damage due to earthquake occurrence. 
The methodology addresses the risk measurement aspect of the traditional risk 
management framework. The next chapter applies the methodology to the Indiana bridge 
network to demonstrate how network-level security analysis will help decision-makers 
prioritize assets for risk management
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CHAPTER 5: NETWORK LEVEL CASE STUDY 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter applies the methodology developed in this dissertation to a 
transportation network. The Indiana state bridge network was used for the network-level 
case study along with earthquake threat information. The methodology is applied to each 
individual bridge to ascertain the security trends of the system. This analysis will help 
identify areas of security concern based on the three relevant security factors and spatial 
analysis of bridge security ratings. The security ratings of specific groups of bridges will 
determine if certain bridge characteristics play a significant role in asset security.  
5.2. Data 
The data compiled to demonstrate the methodology was from the Federal 
Highway Administration National Bridge Inventory (NBI) for the state of Indiana. The 
data collected for highway bridges included; the year of construction, total deck width, 
bridge length, superstructure material type, design type, condition, county location, 
average daily travel (ADT), roadways or waterways under a bridge, and detour length. 
Additional data included the number of earthquake epicenters in a county, county 
population data, county precipitation, county freeze index, construction cost, construction 
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time, replacement cost and asset value.  Data for each specific security factor are listed in 
Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Data Needs, Security Factors for Security Rating 
 
Factors Data Needs 
Threat Likelihood Natural Hazards 
Freeze Index 
Precipitation 
Environmental Barriers (waterways) 













Travel Time Increase from Detour 
 
The data for natural hazards (earthquake epicenters) and county populations in 
Indiana was located in the IndianaMAP geographic information system (GIS) map 
database (IGS, 2014). Freeze index and precipitation data for Indiana was located in the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) database. Bridge 
replacement costs, values and construction costs were used from a study done on asset 
valuation in the state of Indiana (Dojutrek et al., 2012). The Elemental Decomposition 
and Multi-criteria (EDMC) valuation method was utilized to find the values of all bridges 
in the state of Indiana (Dojutrek et al., 2014). Table 5.2. presents the cost models used for 
bridge component replacement costs (Rodriguez et al., 2006). Construction time was 
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assumed to be related to construction cost, and travel time increase was assumed to relate 
to detour length and a travel speed of 45 miles per hour.   












Superstructure ,¨5 = . 2598 + .066 ∗ 5($,)($,,$#∗ !+.ªLNN ∗ )#M .§NNO 
$74.28 
Substructure ,¨! = 1.2603 ∗ !+.LLNP ∗ ,¨!« .§¦§ $250.60 
Approach  55 = 53.6713 + .1970 ∗  #) N/A 




Superstructure ,¨5 = .0244 ∗ !+L.<ª§¥ ∗ )#ML.<PNP $64.55 
Substructure ,¨! = −37.848 + .023 ∗ #  $134.43 
Approach  55 = −772 + .563 ∗ !+ + 19.05 ∗ )#M+ 18.71 ∗ ,¨!« 
N/A 
Other X)« = .0422 ∗ !+
.PNªO ∗ )#ML.OPLN




Superstructure $56.66/sq.ft.  
Substructure $17.12/sq.ft.  
Approach $56.36/sq.ft.  
Other $45.12/sq.ft.  
Source: Rodriguez et al. 2006   
 
Where SUPC is the total superstructure replacement cost for bridges (1,000’s 2002$); BL is the bridge 
length (ft.); TDW is the total deck width (ft.); PRESTRESSED holds a value of 1 if the superstructure made 
of prestressed concrete, 0 otherwise; SUBC is the total substructure replacement cost (1,000’s 2002$); 
SUBH is the substructure height (ft.); APPC is the total approach replacement cost (1,000’s 2002$); ADT is 
the average daily traffic; OTHC contains the costs related to traffic control, excavation, mobilization, 
demobilization, and office expenses (1,000’s 2002$); and DA is the deck area (sq.ft.). 
5.3. Network Level Security Rating Analysis  
The security rating method was applied to each bridge in the state of Indiana at 
the asset-level using the data described above. Distributions of each security factor for the 






























































Consequence Factor Distribution Plot
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The security rating histogram of all bridges in the state of Indiana is visualized in Figure 
5.4. Many of Indiana’s bridges have a low-to-medium security rating with some bridges 
in the very low security rating range. The bridges with low security ratings may be of 





Figure 5.4. Indiana Bridge Network Level Histogram of Security Rating 
 
 
Security ratings for Indiana’s bridge network were calculated and the factors for 
each bridge were graphed in different combinations (Figures 5.5-5.7.). Of the total 
number of bridges in Indiana, 2.34% of the bridges have low security ratings (1.67<SR), 
62.91% of the bridges have low-to-medium security ratings (1.67<SR<5.0), 30.77% of 
the bridges have medium-to-high security ratings (5.0<SR<8.35), and 3.99% of Indiana 















Figure 5.7. Indiana Bridge Network Threat Likelihood-Consequence Nomograph 
 
 
As demonstrated in the figures, many of Indiana’s bridges lie in the high 
importance (dark gray) regions. Further analysis was conducted by organizing the Indiana 
bridge network by material type, geographic region, route type, and NHS status. To 
normalize each category, the frequency of each security rating was divided by the total 
number of bridges in each category. The normalized frequency numbers were presented 
as percentages. For example, in Figure 5.8., there are a higher percentage of urban 
bridges with a security rating of 5.0 than rural bridges. The scale in Figure 5.4. is based 
on Indiana network security ratings with a mid-range rating of 5.0. If a security rating of 
1.67 is the cutoff for assets that require large improvements to increase their security, 




Figure 5.8. Security Rating of Bridges by Geographic Region. 
 
 
The percentage of rural bridges with a security rating below 1.67 is 1.42% while 
urban bridges have 4.12% below this rating (Figure 5.8.). This implies that urban bridges 
have increased design standards for large traffic volumes and may receive a greater 
frequency of maintenance due to wear and tear. Rural bridges may have lower design 
standards due to low traffic volumes and may require less frequent maintenance cycles 
due to less traffic wear and tear. More frequent maintenance may increase asset 






























Figure 5.9. Security Rating of Bridges by Route Type 
 
 
Interstate, U.S. route, and state route bridges had percentages of 0.55%, 2.42%, and 
2.15% of their bridges below a security rating of 1.67 (Figure 5.9.). This implies that 
Interstate bridges have higher design standards (e.g., thicker pavement) which play a role 
in increasing security ratings while U.S. route and state route bridges have different or 
less stringent design standards compared to interstate bridges. By combining 
geographical location and bridge type (Figure 5.10.), 0.55% of rural interstate bridges are 
below the 1.67 security rating and 5.39% of urban interstate bridges. This implies that 
interstate bridges located in an urban location may have higher design standards, but the 
consequences of failure are greater than in a rural location. More people are located in 
urban areas to travel over the bridges and may be affected if the bridge was closed due to 






























Figure 5.10. Security Rating of Interstate Bridges by Geographic Region  
 
 
Figure 5.11. Security Rating of Bridges by NHS Status 
 
 
Non-NHS (National Highway System) bridges had 2.17% of bridges below a 
























































can result from higher traffic volumes on NHS roads and therefore greater consequences 
from travel time increases and possible injuries if the bridge fails. Non-NHS roads may 
be are locally managed and may not be held to the standards indicated for NHS 
roadways, but may be less traveled. These characteristics may lead to the differences in 
total percentage of bridges below the 1.67 security rating threshold.  
 
 
Figure 5.12. Security Rating of Bridges by Material Type 
 
 
Steel, concrete, and pre-stressed concrete bridges had 3.73%, 0.69%, and 1.55% 
of their total bridges below the 1.67 security rating. This implies that concrete bridges 
may be more secure than steel bridges, but could be due to geographic location. Steel 
bridges may be located in more urban areas while concrete bridges could be located in 
rural areas. Additionally, different bridge types may have been preferred over others in 
past construction practices therefore leading to the differences. These characteristics 




























concrete steel pre-stressed concrete
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5.3.1. Spatial Analysis 
Further modeling techniques should be conducted to examine the security rating 
and infrastructure characteristics interaction through GIS ArcMap 10.1 for spatial 
analysis. As seen in Figure 5.13., many bridges around Indianapolis, Indiana have a low 
security rating. Indianapolis is in an urban location with a high population density. Many 
bridges leading into the city are highly traveled and, if closed, can cause large traffic 
delays. Therefore, these characteristics can play a large role in the low security ratings of 
these bridges. Additionally, many bridges located in the outer perimeter of Indianapolis 
have a higher security rating, implying that these bridges may be less traveled and located 
outside the urban area. From an agency perspective, spatial analysis provides the means 
to pinpoint low security areas where improvements should be focused. Spatial analysis 
would help identify areas of high consequences in the case that a bridge did fail. In 






Figure 5.13. Visualization of Indianapolis Bridges using Security Rating 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
By analyzing transportation infrastructure from a network-level perspective, 
specific infrastructure types with low security ratings are identified. The characteristics 
that lead to low security ratings are able to be cataloged for future reference. Spatial 
analysis further enables agencies and stakeholders to visualize areas of concern and work 
to secure the infrastructure in those locations. This case study is an example of analyzing 
infrastructure at the network level based solely on security. Chapter 6 further describes 




CHAPTER 6: INCORPORATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
6.1. Introduction 
In view of their inherently dynamic and highly unpredictable nature, threat 
likelihood, infrastructure resilience, and consequence are difficult to determine with 
certainty. Due to this problem, this chapter enhances the basic framework presented in 
the previous chapter using fuzzy logic techniques. The method is particularly useful when 
data is unavailable or imprecise, allowing the security rating to be determined using a 
qualitative expert-assigned level with each factor contributing to overall security. The 
evaluation of the security factors are represented as fuzzy triangular numbers with 
accompanying membership rules that define the extent of contribution by each factor to 
overall infrastructure security. Then, using a case study, the chapter applies the fuzzy-
based methodology to illustrate how uncertainty considerations could be included in 
determining the overall security of specific infrastructure.    
6.2. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty causes encompass a wide range including: lack of information, an 
abundance of information (complexity), conflicting evidence, ambiguity, measurement, 
etc. Uncertainty due to ambiguity includes (i) physical randomness, (ii) statistical 
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uncertainty due to limited information in estimation and the characteristics of these 
variables, and (iii) model uncertainty due to simplifying assumptions in analytical 
models, predicative models, simplified methods, and idealized representations of real 
performances (Ayyub and Gupta, 1997). Uncertainty due to vagueness is caused by (i) 
variable definitions, (ii) human error and factors, and (iii) defining interrelationships 
among problems variables (Ayyub, 1992). Information can also vary from set numerical 
data to rough linguistic opinion, which in turn determines the quality and quantity of 
available data. In this dissertation, uncertainty is defined as “a human-related subjective 
notion which depends on the quantity and quality of information which is available to a 
decision-maker about a system of its behavior that the decision-maker wants to describe, 
predict, or prescribe.” This is the same manner in which uncertainty is identified by 
Ayyub and Gupta (1997).    
Threat likelihood is very uncertain due to the nature of natural and man-made 
threats. It is difficult to predict with certainty the exact moment transportation 
infrastructure is likely to fail due to the complexity of both internal and outside forces. 
For example, a bridge may be located near an earthquake fault, but it may have been 
dormant for many years. In this instance, a sudden catastrophic tremor may occur 
seemingly without warning. Similarly, if infrastructure is built with faulty material or a 
design flaw, the infrastructure may not be affected until the component fails, often 
without notice. Accidents and threats of both natural and man-made variety cannot be 
predicted with 100% accuracy due to their inherently uncertain nature.  
Consequences are also highly variable and not easily predicted. For example, a 
component of a bridge may fail, but the bridge may still appear to be structurally sound 
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before the problem is found. In another case, an important component failing may lead 
the entire bridge to succumb. Additionally, the consequences due to a bridge closure may 
affect users and agencies differently. A user may have increased travel time due to re-
routing to another bridge to get across a river, while an agency would need to find 
additional funds to repair a damaged bridge. The uncertain nature of infrastructure 
damage and its consequences lead to ambiguity in predicting them.  
Resilience is also uncertain in nature because infrastructure can be designed and 
built to be resilient, but a mistake in the drawings or construction can lead to failure 
during a threat occurrence. Uncertainty must be accounted for when security of 
infrastructure is being explored.     
6.3. Fuzzy Logic Framework  
As previously stated, the security of an infrastructure is a function of three main 
factors: (1) the threat likelihood, (2) infrastructure resilience, and (3) consequence. The 
security rating metric developed in Chapter 3 combines these factors. This chapter duly 
accommodates the fact that all three factors are characterized by a significant degree of 
uncertainty; and therefore, introduces fuzziness in the levels of these factors and in their 
outcome (e.g., the security rating). The enhancements to this method will allow experts to 
use the security rating method in situations where they are faced with imprecise or 
inadequate data.    
A fuzzy logic framework for fuzzification of the security-related measures and 
attributes is particularly useful when decision makers lack access to infrastructure-
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specific information for each factor. The framework inputs fuzzy data into the security 
rating equation to yield a fuzzy output. The Matlab Fuzzy Toolbox (MathWorks, 2013) 
was used to program this framework. For example, each factor can be fuzzified to output 
a level of that specific factor as seen for the threat likelihood factor (Figure 6.2.) 
(Dojutrek, et al, 2014). Each measure has a “degree of membership” ranging from low to 
high on a pre-specified scale. The value of the factor depends on the level of each 
measure, and the measure levels are in turn determined by their respective consistent 
attributes. The value of each fuzzified factor is then input into the overall security rating 
fuzzy-based analysis that yields a fuzzy security rating for a specific infrastructure 
(Figure 6.1.).  
 
 









(c) Consequence Factor 
 










(b) Fuzzy Threat Likelihood Model 
 






Figure 6.3. Fuzzy Security Rating. 
6.4. Rules 
Fuzzy rules were developed to determine the fuzzy security rating output for the 
fuzzy logic system. The rules give mathematical meaning to the different linguistic levels 
of each factor in the security rating framework (Figure 6.4.). Thus, a complete fuzzy 
inference system is created. Fuzzy membership functions for the security rating are 
shown in Figure 6.4.  
Rules: 
If resilience is high, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low, then SR is high. 
If resilience is high, consequence is high, and threat likelihood is high, then SR is 
medium. 
If resilience is high, consequence is medium, and threat likelihood is medium, then SR is 
medium. 
If resilience is medium, consequence is medium, and threat likelihood is medium, then 
SR is medium. 
If resilience is medium, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low, then SR is 
medium. 
If resilience is medium, consequence is high, and threat likelihood is high, then SR is 
low. 




If resilience is low, consequence is high, and threat likelihood is high, then SR is low. 




Low Medium High 
Consequence Consequence Consequence 
L M H L M H L M H 
Resilience 
Low                   
Medium                   
High                   
  Low SR   Medium SR   High SR 
 






Figure 6.5. Fuzzy Membership Functions. 
6.5. Case Study for Fuzzy Security Rating  
To demonstrate the framework developed for fuzzifying the security ratio, the Leo 
Figo Memorial Bridge in Green Bay, Wisconsin, National Bridge Inventory (NBI) 
structure number B05015800100000, was used (Figure 6.6.). Data was collected from the 
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National Bridge Inventory (FHWAb, 2014). The factors, measures, and attributes used 















A number of assumptions were made for this case study. First, the construction 
time (days) was based on the bridge size (ft2). Second, environmental barriers were 
assumed to be the waterway under the bridge. The detour travel speed was assumed to be 
45mph, and all weights in the security rating equation (α, δ, λ) and measures equation 
were assumed to be equal. Threat likelihood measures, attributes, and scales can be seen 
in Table 6.1. This data was taken from the NBI database. The result of each measure is 
the scaled attributes multiplied together and normalized by the number of attributes for 
each measure, and then subsequently multiplied by the measure’s weight. An uncertainty-
based expression of the degree of the threat likelihood, asset resilience, and consequence 
is established after these results are analyzed. The fuzzy degree of threat likelihood is 1.6, 















Table 6.1. LFM Bridge Factor Data. 
 
Threat Likelihood 
Access to Asset 
Environmental Barriers Over Fox River 3 3 
 
 
Physical Barriers Independent bridge protection 2 
Location Specific 
Hazards 
Natural Hazards High winds, fog 4 
2.66 County Freeze Index 189.3 2 
County Precipitation 29.52 1 
Resilience 
Resistance  Condition  Deck: 8 5 
50 
Superstructure: 7  5  
Substructure: 6 4  
Age  35 yrs  2  
Recoverability  Const. Time  3yrs  3  
9 Const. Cost  $6.85M  3  
Asset Size  39,115 ft2  3  
Asset Characteristics Material  Steel  4  
2 




Population  Green Bay: 104,868 
Brown County: 253,032 
4  
6 
AADT  31,400 3 
Property Loss  Replacement Cost  $6.92M  3  
3 
EDMC Value  $4.34M  2  
Mission Disruption Detour Length (miles)  ~6 miles  2  
4 Inc. in travel time due 
to detour  
8  min  4  
 
 
The fuzzy degree of each security factor, (threat likelihood, resilience, and consequence), 
are input into the fuzzy security rating framework (Figure 6.8.), which results in an 
overall fuzzy security rating of 5.84 for the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge. This rating 





Figure 6.8. Overall Fuzzy Security Rating. 
6.6. Monte Carlo Simulation 
A technique is needed to examine how variations in the security factors for a 
specific infrastructure influence the resulting security rating, given a normal distribution 
of each factor based on the average and standard deviation of all the security factors. For 
this, the Monte Carlo simulation was used. The Monte Carlo simulation is a 
computerized mathematical technique that allows people to account for variability in 
their process to enhance quantitative analysis and decision making (Palisade Co., 2014). 
The simulation works by analyzing models of a range of possible values and results 
(probability distributions) for any factor that has inherent uncertainty. The simulation 
establishes the outcome of thousands of scenarios each using a different set of random 
values from the probability distributions. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are 
the distributions of possible outcome values. A Monte Carlo simulation has a number of 
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advantages over deterministic analysis including: probabilistic results (what could happen 
and how likely each outcome is), graphical results; sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis 
(see which inputs had which values together when certain outcomes occurred), and 
correlation of inputs. 
Figure 6.9. gives a visual representation of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure 
for the security rating. The probability distributions shown in the figure are only for 
illustration. Figure 6.10 was developed for the actual distributions. A total of 5,000 
iterations were run for the simulation where the mean and standard deviation of the 
starting parameters (threat likelihood, resilience, and consequence) were derived from the 
Indiana NBI bridge database. Table 6.2. presents the statistics associated with the Monte 














(c) Threat Likelihood Factor 
 
Figure 6.10. Distributions of Security Factors.  
 
 
Table 6.2. Monte Carlo Simulation Probabilistic Security Rating 
 
Statistics Bridge 
Total Simulation Runs 5,000 
Sample Mean 5.653 
Median 4.808 
Sample Standard Deviation 3.477 
Quartile (.75), Quartile (.25) 7.117, 3.326 
Skewness 2.09 
Kurtosis 8.10 
Inter-quartile Range 3.791 
Standard Error 0.049 
95% Upper, Lower Confidence Level 5.749, 5.557 
95% Central Interval Limits 1.522, 14.545 
  
Kurtosis captures the steep or gradual slope of a distribution compared to the 















































Threat Likelihood Factor Probability Distribution
114 
 
kurtosis indicates a relatively flat distribution. Skewness captures the degree of 
asymmetry of a distribution surrounding its mean. Positive skewness indicates that the 
tail of a distribution is asymmetric toward the positive values. Negative skewness 
indicates that the tail of a distribution is asymmetric toward the negative values. The 
mean security rating from the simulation is 5.653, indicating a “medium” security rating. 
The positive kurtosis indicates the distribution is relatively peaked at the mean; and the 
positive skewness indicates the tails of the distribution are asymmetrical, leaning towards 
higher security ratings. The quartile ranges indicate that most security ratings for the 
simulation are in the “medium” range for this bridge.  
6.7. Chapter Summary and Discussion 
Previous literature did not adequately consider the uncertain nature of threat 
likelihood, infrastructure resilience, and consequences in the event of threat occurrence. 
The information was largely qualitative in several other methodologies. A method that 
can transform such qualitative information into a quantitative form would be useful in 
overall security and ultimately in prioritizing infrastructure for transportation investment 
evaluation or security funding allocation.     
This chapter first presented a framework to quantify the three factors of security 
using fuzzy logic. Each security factor was fuzzified using “high,” “medium,” and “low” 
levels of its respective measures and membership functions. The factors were input into 
the framework that provides the fuzzy security rating for specific infrastructure. A fuzzy 
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system captures the dynamic and uncertain nature of each security factor by creating a 
fuzzy set of numbers for each level of membership.   
 The Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge in Green Bay, Wisconsin was used as a case 
study for the fuzzy-based framework. Data was taken from the United States National 
Bridge Inventory database to use as an example for determining security measure levels 
and membership functions for each security factor. All the attribute values were scaled, 
and the respective measures fuzzified for input into the overall fuzzy security rating 
framework. The Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge was found to have a security rating of 5.84 
which can be considered “medium.” The case study illustrated how the fuzzy security 
rating can account for the uncertain nature of the security-related data.        
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CHAPTER 7: USING SECURITY RATING IN INVESTMENT EVALUATION OR 
PRIORITIZATION 
7.1. Introduction 
Security is a performance criteria associated with little observable return on 
investment. This makes it difficult to balance security costs with other more traditional 
transportation agency initiatives such as economic efficiency, travel time, and/or safety 
(SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). Security initiatives must be well defined in order to 
successfully compete with other performance measures in the context of multi-criteria 
decision-making. This chapter creates a case for including security as a stand-alone 
performance measure and prioritizing projects based on their individual contributions to 
security improvement. Increase in security due to alternative improvements has the 
potential to influence decisions in a multi-criteria evaluation process.  
7.2. Security Rating as a Performance Measure 
Many considerations must be addressed when choosing evaluation criteria for 
security investments. In terms of security, effectiveness (benefits) can be captured in the 
resilience term. A highly resilient infrastructure will withstand damage from a hazard and 
reduce the consequences associated with total destruction of the asset. Security costs 
include the consequences due to infrastructure damage from a threat. Examples include 
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both agency costs (damage costs and repair costs) and user costs (travel time increase and 
detours). The impact on security due to an alternative improvement can be captured 
through the security rating. The cost effectiveness of an alternative investment can be 
measured in terms of the increase to the security rating or the security rating of an asset 
after implementation of the investment project. Figure 7.1. provides a depiction of the 
change in security rating over time for a given asset. When the asset is first constructed, 
the security rating is most likely to be high due to the fact that new construction more 
frequently adheres to modern building standards. Throughout the asset lifecycle, the 
security rating will decrease due to increased usage, general wear and tear, and ageing of 
the physical infrastructure (e.g., increased travel demand, environmental impacts, or 
obsolete building standards). The existing security rating (ESR) for an asset at any time t, 
would reflect these gradual changes. When an improvement is performed, the security 
rating should increase promptly which can be measured as a final security rating (FSR). 
For example, an improvement to rehabilitate a bridge would provide current design 
standards for the construction, thereby improving the bridge’s physical structure and 
resilience. This change in security rating offers another measure of effectiveness for an 




Figure 7.1. Conceptual Changes in Security Rating over Time 
7.3. Using Security Rating in Prioritizing Transportation Security Investments Only 
To incorporate the security rating into a multi-criteria evaluation as a performance 
measure, the ESR is used in order to capture the current state of an asset as a generic 
performance measure without the influence of an alternative (Table 7.1.). The increase in 
security rating (ISR) is an alternative-specific measure that captures the alternative’s 
influence on the security of an asset (Table 7.2.). The FSR is another alternative-specific 
measure that provides an interaction measure between an asset’s current security rating 
and the effects the improvement would cause (Table 7.3.). The ESR allows the decision-
maker to prioritize assets based on their current security rating without the influence of 
improvement benefits. This evaluation is useful to determine which assets have the 
greatest need for security improvements at the current time. The ESR does not indicate 
the overall effects of an improvement to a transportation infrastructure network. This 
evaluation method should be used for asset-level prioritization. The ISR evaluation 
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method allows a decision-maker to determine the extent an improvement may influence 
the security of an asset. This method may be misleading if only alternatives with large 
security increases are considered. The alternatives with small security increases should 
not be ruled out solely due to this method. The FSR provides the decision-maker with the 
security rating of an asset after an improvement is completed. This method is useful to 
determine the overall security improvement to a transportation network. The drawback of 
this method is that greater consideration is given to assets that start with a high security 
rating where an improvement could only increase security further. Assets with lower 
security ratings increase in security but generally would not overcome those that started 
with large security ratings with this method. Each of these methods is useful in 
prioritizing security improvement alternatives based on the specific objective of interest 
to decision-makers.  
 
Table 7.1. Simple Example of Existing Security Rating Prioritization 
 
Asset  Existing Security Rating (ESR)  Priority Rank on the Basis of Existing Security Rating  
Asset 1  3.22  3  
Asset 2 2.45  1  
Asset 3  5.65  4 
Asset 4  7.40  5  
Asset 5  8.18  6  
Asset 6  3.12  2  
   
 
The ESR prioritization indicates that assets with low initial security ratings should 
be placed at a higher priority level for improvements. In the example in Table 7.1., Asset 




Table 7.2. Simple Example of Increase in Security Rating Prioritization 
 








Asset 1 Bridge Superstructure Reinforcement 3.22 4.57 3 2 
Asset 2 Bridge Pier Improvement 2.45 3.00 1 4 
Asset 3 Bridge Rehabilitation 5.65 4.00 4 3 
Asset 4 Bridge Guardrail Replacement 7.40 0.52 5 6 
Asset 5 Bridge Deck Repair 8.18 1.32 6 5 
Asset 6 Bridge Substructure Reinforcement 3.12 4.88 2 1 
1ESR: Existing Security Rating; ISR: Increase in Security Rating 
 
The ISR prioritization indicates that the asset with the greatest associated 
improvement and, therefore, increase in security is given the highest priority. In the 
example in Table 7.2., Asset 6 would be given priority due to its relatively high increase 
in security. This example illustrates the drawback of only considering the increase in 
security, as opposed to focusing on the low ESR of Asset 2.     
 
Table 7.3. Simple Example of Final Security Rating Prioritization 
 















Asset 1 Bridge Superstructure Reinforcement 3.22 4.57 7.79 3 2 5 
Asset 2 Bridge Pier Improvement 2.45 3.00 5.45 1 4 6 
Asset 3 Bridge Rehabilitation 5.65 4.00 9.65 4 3 1 
Asset 4 Bridge Guardrail Replacement 7.40 0.52 7.92 5 6 4 
Asset 5 Bridge Deck Repair 8.18 1.32 9.50 6 5 2 
Asset 6 Bridge Substructure Reinforcement 3.12 4.88 8.00 2 1 3 
1ESR: Existing Security Rating; ISR: Increase in Security Rating; FSR: Final Security Rating 
 
 
The asset and alternative with the greatest security rating after an improvement is 
given the highest priority. In the example in Table 7.3., Asset 3 would be given highest 
priority. This example illustrates how this method could be misleading since the asset 
with the lowest ESR is prioritized last.    
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7.4. Using Security Rating in Evaluating Alternative Transportation Investments 
The concept of security should be incorporated into multi-criteria evaluation by 
including security as one of the several performance measures already in use to evaluate 
transportation infrastructure investments. Traditionally, the performance measures used 
in project evaluation include: 
• Air quality 
• Noise 
• Economic Efficiency 
• Economic Development 
• Travel Time 
• Safety  
• Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC) 
• Connectivity 
The prioritization of transportation assets typically utilizes performance measures 
related to asset characteristics, operations, and the surrounding environment. These 
criteria generally do not consider asset security, which is a function of the threat 
likelihood/magnitude, resilience of the transportation asset, and the resulting 
consequences of a potential threat. This implies that assets with low security do not 
receive the consideration they deserve during project evaluation and prioritization.  
It is feasible to add security as one of these criteria in transportation investment 
evaluation, prioritization, and decision making. The addition of a security performance 
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measure would increase the pool of available projects from which to select from when 
performing multi-criteria evaluation of alternative projects (Figure 7.2.).  
 
Figure 7.2. Multiple-Criteria Nature of Highway Investment Impacts 
 
 
Secondly, the effectiveness of each alternative, regardless of type, can be converted into 
terms of security. The evaluation benefits can capture how well an improvement 
increases resilience and decreases potential consequences. Alternative evaluation is then 
performed based on the amount each alternative influences the security of an asset 
(Figure 7.3.). The security rating is useful to normalize the benefits of project 





Figure 7.3. Importance of Security in Investment Evaluation 
7.5. Chapter Summary 
The evaluation of transportation assets typically utilizes performance measures 
related to asset characteristics, operations, and the surrounding environment. These 
evaluation methods generally do not consider asset security. This chapter provides a case 
for utilizing security as a performance measure by presenting example project 
alternatives prioritized by existing security ratings, increases in security ratings due to 
improvements, and the final security ratings after an improvement. The chapter further 
identified how security improvement projects should be included in a candidate project 
alternative pool and how each alternative in the pool can be prioritized based on their 
contribution to asset security. Security is a viable performance measure among the 
current performance measures identified for transportation project decision-making. The 
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next chapter provides a summary and discussion of the overall framework developed in 





CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Summary and Discussion 
The first part of this dissertation provides an overview of the importance of 
transportation to society, the potential consequences that affect transportation services, 
current transportation security measures, and an overview of literature pertaining to 
different security methodologies. Many of the reviewed methods utilize a risk equation 
that identifies three main factors which, combined, provide a measure of risk. The first 
factor is the likelihood of threat, the second is the vulnerability of an asset due to a threat, 
and the third is consequences resulting should the asset become damaged or fail. Threat 
refers to any unexpected natural, unintentional man-made, or intentional man-made event 
that causes damage or disruption. Threat likelihood pertains to the probability of a threat 
occurring, either natural or man-made, that could cause the damage and/failure of the 
infrastructure being assessed. Consequence is defined as the collective costs and 
associated losses of damaged or destroyed infrastructure due to a threat. This dissertation 
provides an argument to retain the threat likelihood and consequence factors within the 
risk equation, while replacing the third factor with the concept of resilience. Resilience is 
a function of vulnerability, defined as the ability of infrastructure to resist and recover 
from a threat. Resilience captures the concept of vulnerability by accounting for the 
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weaknesses inherent in infrastructure that have the potential to fail. More specifically, in 
this dissertation, resilience is defined as the ability of infrastructure to withstand a 
potential threat.  
The second part of the dissertation presents a framework for quantifying the 
security of transportation infrastructure based on three factors: threat likelihood, 
consequences of threats, and infrastructure resilience. The three factors are weighted and 
mathematically combined to provide a quantitative security rating for a transportation 
asset. Within each factor, a series of measures were identified in order to capture the 
performance of infrastructure in terms of resilience, threat likelihood, and potential 
consequences due to damage or failure. Furthermore, the measures are divided into 
attributes that incorporate a specific level of contribution, rated on a scale, to define the 
overall amount that each measure contributes to a specific security factor. The attributes 
are scaled so that they normalize distinct measurement units in order to be included into 
the security rating framework.  
The John F. Kennedy Bridge in Jeffersonville, Indiana was identified as the asset-
level case study to apply this security rating methodology. The security rating of the the 
John F. Kennedy Bridge was 1.31. This security rating, on a scale of zero to ten, is a 
relatively low rating and necessitates improvements. A network level case study was 
carried out for the bridge network in Indiana. The methodology determined that 2.34% of 
Indiana bridges have low security ratings (1.67<SR), 62.91% have low-to-medium 
security ratings (1.67<SR<5.0), 30.77% have medium-to-high security ratings 
(5.0<SR<8.35), and 3.99% of Indiana bridges have high security ratings (SR>8.35). 
Bridges in Indiana were grouped by material type, geographic region, roadway type, and 
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NHS status for further security analysis. The percentage of rural bridges with a security 
rating below 1.67 is 1.42%, while urban bridges have 4.12% below this rating. Interstate, 
U.S. route, and state route bridges had 0.55%, 2.42%, and 2.15% of their bridges below a 
security rating of 1.67 respectively. Non-NHS (National Highway System) bridges have 
2.17% of their bridges below a security rating of 1.67, and NHS bridges have 2.64% of 
their bridges below this same rating. Steel, concrete, and pre-stressed concrete bridges 
had 3.73%, 0.69%, and 1.55% of their total bridges below the 0.4 security rating 
respectively. Additionally, bridges of concern could be spatially identified using ArcGIS 
and the security rating to determine areas of focus. Based on the network-level case 
study, the methodology would provide decision-makers with the ability to analyze 
transportation infrastructure at both the asset and network-level for security purposes. 
In order to incorporate uncertainty, a fuzzy security rating was developed and a 
Monte Carlo simulation was run. A fuzzy security rating would allow for stochastic 
security factors to account for missing data or unknown measures. This method relies on 
expert opinion to determine the extent each factor affects overall security of an asset. In 
this case, each factor has a “high,” “medium,” or “low” level which determines the fuzzy 
security rating based on defined rules. As mentioned in Chapter 6, an example of a fuzzy 
rule is: If resilience is high, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low then the 
Security Rating is high. Additionally, fuzzification of each measure and associated 
attributes can account for more uncertainty. A case study using the fuzzy security rating 
framework was performed for the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge in Green Bay, Wisconsin. 
The fuzzy security rating of this bridge was 5.84, equating to a “medium” level of 
security. A Monte Carlo simulation was run to provide an average output for a bridge 
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given a probability distribution for each security factor. The mean sample security rating 
was 5.65, a medium rating indicating some improvements may be needed for security 
purposes.  
Finally, a case was made to include security in multi-criteria evaluation. 
Prioritizing security investments and including security in the plethora of criteria for 
evaluation was explored. Decision-makers would be able to use the security rating 
framework to identify infrastructure in need of improvement based on the asset’s current 
security rating, an increase in security rating due to a potential improvement, and a final 
security rating of an asset after an improvement was completed. Security as a 
performance measure for all project types would enable decisions to be made based on 
the alternative’s contribution to asset security.       
8.2. Future Improvements 
This dissertation provides a framework for quantifying security in terms of asset 
resilience, threat likelihood, and consequences due to threats. The methodology it 
outlines has the potential to be utilized in fields outside of transportation in order to 
provide security ratings for varying types of infrastructure. In this case, new experts must 
be consulted to develop specific rating scales as well as to provide weights to each 
individual security measure and factor. The scales in this dissertation, however, are linear 
in nature and should be enhanced through non-linear models. Future work in this area 
would provide a security rating scale based on the new attribute scales and specifically 
identified measures of importance.   
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Optimization models already in practice should be run with the inclusion of the 
security rating performance measure, and any variations to the final output should be 
analyzed. Interaction effects between performance measures could be analyzed in a 
separate model. Conversion of project alternatives from various transportation 
improvement systems (e.g., pavement management system, safety management system, 
and congestion management system) should be measured in terms of security and input 
into the optimization model. This optimization model would be able to determine the 
benefits of making alternative decisions with the context of security.      
8.3. Conclusion 
 
 The risk methodologies reviewed in the literature tend to provide differing 
definitions for similar security factors and combine these factors in a myriad of 
techniques. These methods rely on the current risk equation which relates the factors of 
threat likelihood, vulnerability, and consequence. The proposed security rating 
framework improves this equation by including the factor of resilience. Resilience is 
defined as the ability of infrastructure to withstand threats. With these three factors, a 
framework was developed to provide decision-makers with a method to quantify security 
for transportation infrastructure. The framework outlines the measures and attributes 
associated with each factor that contribute to security. The framework was fuzzified and a 
Monte Carlo simulation was run to account for uncertainty within the method. Threats are 
highly non-deterministic, therefore it is beneficial to include a probability distribution and 
range of factor levels in the framework. This helps to provide a range of potential security 
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outcomes. Finally, security should be considered as a performance measure within 
transportation project evaluation itself. Decision-makers would then gain the ability to 
prioritize infrastructure improvements based on their security contribution, by including 
security as one of the many performance measures in multi-criteria evaluation. Security 
of transportation infrastructure is integral to keep people and goods moving throughout 
the world. The transportation sector provides millions of employment opportunities and 
greatly contributes to the gross domestic economy of the United States. Without 
transportation, most activities would come to a standstill and lead to an immense 
economic decline. Protection of transportation infrastructure is of the utmost importance 
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